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Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in
exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for
the support of any one establishment, may force him to
conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
-James Madison'
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Home to Catholic University, see infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text, and currently
represent Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty in an Establishment Clause challenge to the
Medicare and Medicaid payments made to Christian Science Sanitoria. See Petition for a
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1. James Madison,Memorial andRemonstranceAgainstRelgiousAssessments (1785),
reprinted in Everson v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1 app. at 65 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
[hereinafter Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance].
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The United States is in the midst of the greatest wealth transfer
from government to religious entities in its history.2 The shift has
been incremental and has occurred on a number of distinct fronts,
and therefore has not been apparent to the casual observer.
Because of the case and controversy requirement, which focuses the
attention of judges and Justices on one case at a time, it is also a
shift that may have been unnoticed by the judiciary and those who
observe it.' Yet it has been a fast ride down a slippery slope about
which James Madison warned over two hundred years ago. This
slippery slope principle enunciated by Madison is reprinted in the
epigraph at the beginning of this Article, and stands at least in part
for the principle that small amounts of government aid open the
door to greater amounts.
Although the courts are permitted to decide only one case at a
time, in the Establishment Clause context, they typically and
appropriately have considered the contemporaneous balance of
power between church and state.4 There has been an instinctual
search for a balance that simultaneously empowers church and
state while deterring both from overreaching. This is no easy task,
but its paradoxical nature is built into the Constitution by the
pairing of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses in the First
Amendment. This principle of balance has led the Court away from
a dogmatic reading of the Clauses: The free exercise of religion does
not give carte blanche to religion to supersede all laws.6 And the
2. By "wealth transfer," I mean any action that improves the financial position of the
recipient.
3. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
4. For a discussion ofthe Establishment Clause as requiring a balance ofpower between
church and state, see Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers,
31 CONN. L. REv. 807, 825-26 (1999) [hereinafter Hamilton, Vouchers] and Marci A.
Hamilton, A Reply, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1001, 1003-04 (1999).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ").
6. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990); Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 386-90 (1990); Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 448-52 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342 (1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("[Tlhe Court has rejected
challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts
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Establishment Clause has not been read to preclude church-state
relations in all circumstances.' I have argued previously that this
search for a balance of power is the most true to constitutional
intent, because it recognizes the Framers' fundamental insight that
the two most authoritarian structures of human existence-religion
and the state-are not static structures. Nor is the power they hold.
Instead, the power they wield is malleable, and the Framers rightly
assumed that both would attempt to stretch their powers in
unpredictable ways.' Therefore, achieving a balance of power is the
best that the courts can do, and bright-line rules are invitations to
abuse.
Some of the most successful grabs for power are those that are
hard to detect, e.g., incremental additions. A stream of financial
advantages has been flowing from government to religion since the
Court decided its first Establishment Clause case, Everson v. Board
of Education, where it held that the government could provide
school buses for children going to religious schools.9 The current has
picked up speed in recent years and has turned a trickle of
government benefits into a torrent. Indeed, we have reached a point
where one distinguished scholar has noted: "The [nonprofit] sector
is thereby marked by a mutual dependence between government
and nonprofit organizations. Neither can get along without the
other."" The time has come to assess the state of the balance today.
In a move that would delight the deconstructionists, the word
"free" in the Free Exercise Clause has been transformed from
prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 'even when the action is in accord with one's
relgious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions."' (second alteration
in original) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961))).
7. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2540-49 (2000); Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 485-89 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1983); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947).
8. See Hamilton, Vouchers, supra note 4, at 810, asserting that:
The task of balancing church-state power is unavoidably difficult. Power does
not exist in static form. Rather, it is plastic in its permutations and infinitely
creative in its drive to realize itself. Thus, the Establishment Clause is charged
with the task ofpolicing a constantly changing boundary between two dynamic
social entities.
9. 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
10. STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED & SECULAR MIX RELIGIOUs NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONSAND PUBLIC MONEY 5 (Religious Forces in the Modem Political World, 1996).
826 [Vol. 42:823
FREE? EXERCISE
meaning "liberty" or "freedom" to its more literal denotation:
costless. Thus, for religious advocates the clause has come to mean
"costless exercise." Cost-free exercise can be achieved through two
means: 1) relieving religious entities of all costs imposed on them
by the law, from taxes and zoning requirements to clergy
malpractice costs; and 2) obtaining government funds for their
needs and'missions. Both constitute a real transfer of wealth from
government to religion.1 As of 2001, religious entities have
triumphed on both fronts.
A key problem of wealth transfer to religion lies in the structure
of the Constitution: accountability. The Constitution is structured
in such a way that no center of power is supposed to spin off into its
own orbit.' Rather, each governmental entity is to be checked by
other governmental structures-the federal branches mutually and
the federal government by the states. Church and State also are
mutually checking. All governmental entities are accountable to the
people in some fashion, even though the people do not directly
control them.'
Government accountability is achieved in part through the
Constitution's institution of an information jurisprudence that
requires a two-way communication pathway between the
government and the people. 4 For example, under the Publications
Clauses, Congress has an obligation to report on its proceedings and
to account to the people where their tax dollars are going and how
they are being spent.'" This principle of accountability is in tension
11. See generally Hamilton, Vouchers, supra note 4, at 816-22 (discussing numerous
instances of religious wealth transfer endorsements by Congress and the Court).
12. The image of the Constitution as a solar system was natural at the time of the
Framing. See Marci A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 3-5 (1997) [hereinafter Hamilton, The People].
13. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1504 (1990); Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth
of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 523-24
(1994) [hereinafter Hamilton, Proposal]; Hamilton, The People, supra note 12, at 9; Edward
L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 393
(1989); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing
and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1991).
14. Seegenerally Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitution and Its Information Pathways 9-
12 (Feb. 1, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Hamilton,
Pathways].
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3; id art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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with most government aid to religion, because religion rightly
resists such public inquiries into its affairs.16 A key element to the
appropriateness-and even success-of such transfers will lie in
achieving accountability for the expenditure of public funds while
respecting religious autonomy.
For example, religious entities have asserted a right to be
autonomous of the government,'1 and have resisted financial
disclosures"8 and government entanglement with their financial
affairs. 9 They also have argued that government accounting
requirements water down their religious mission by forcing them to
16. See, e.g., Robert C. DeGaudenzi, Tax-Exempt Public Charities: Increasing
Accountability and Compliance, 36 CATH. LAw. 203, 231 (1995) (concluding that "measures
aimed at increasing accountability and compliance will benefit the long-term interests of all
public charities by restoring the public's confidence in, and desire to support, charitable
organizations"); Karla W. Simon, Congress and Taxes: A Separation of Powers Analysis, 45
U. MiAUML. REV. 1005, 1021 (1991) (discussing Congress's lack ofaccountabilityto the public
for tax legislation because "the tax laws written by Congress are too detailed and complex
for the members of Congress or their constituents to understand").
17.
The nature of modem administrative bureaucracy makes it nearly inevitable
that government will impose substantial burdens on religious practice-
especially minority religious practice-in the pursuit of relatively unimportant
government goals. In the first place, a variety of factors drive administrative
agencies to seek to expand their jurisdiction. Too often, efforts in this regard
carry regulatory bureaucrats into domains that should in fact be protected
spheres of religious autonomy.
Brief of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints as Amicus Curiae In Support of
Respondents at Pt. III, § B, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 95-2074),
LEXIS, 1995 U.S. Briefs 2074; see Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States Catholic
Conference In Support of Petitioners at 25-28, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos.
96-552, 96-553).
18. See, e.g., Tax Info for Business: Filing Requirements, at http:/www.irs.gov/plainI
bus_info/eo/file-reg.html (last modified June 22, 2000) (stating that "churches and certain
religious organizations, certain state and localinstrumentalities, and other organizations are
excepted from the annual return filing requirement"); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6104(b) (1994 &
Supp. TV 1998) (noting that disclosure of names or addresses of "any contributor to any
organization or trust (other than a private foundation)" is unauthorized).
19. See, e.g., Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal
Income Tax Purposes: Establishment orFree Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71 (1991) (discussing
the propriety of the government's involvement in the financial affairs of religious entities);
Jonathan Friedman, Note, Charitable Choice and the Establishment Clause, 5 GEO. J. ON
FIGHTING POVERTY 103, 112 (1997) (exploring the Constitutionality of Charitable Choice
provisions and noting that "[a]dministrative entanglement might arise from government
efforts to ensure that funding is not being used for religious activities, or from the state's
auditing of a religious institution's financial records").
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separate those portions that receive government money from the
other aspects of their religious organization."0
Because the government is restrained from delving into the books
of religious institutions, the Constitution's core value of
accountability regarding expenditures is inevitably frustrated, with
the likely result being a struggle between religious aid recipients
and the principle of accountability. As with government aid to art,
the safest constitutional answer to the conundrum is to forbid
government aid to the First Amendment-protected activity. 1 Just
as artists' receipt of government money compromises their
independence and power to challenge government hegemony,22
religion's power and integrity is compromised by government funds,
especially when those funds underwrite their mission.2"
Far from moving toward a diminution in such funding, however,
the arguments in support are proliferating. The argument is
increasingly made that religious entities have a right to such wealth
transfers from the government. For example, faith-healing groups,
like the Christian Scientists, have argued for a right to funds from
Medicare.2 Representatives of organized religions have argued to
20. See, e.g., MONSMA, supra note 10, at 105 (noting that 'a sizable minority [of religious
nonprofit organizations] ... are not as free to pursue the religiously based practices that
inhere in their religious traditions as what [sic] they would be if they did not receive public
funds"); Timothy S. Burgett, Note, Government Aid to Religious Social Services Providers:
The Supreme Court's 'Pervasively Sectarian" Standard, 75 VA. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (1989)
("When the government bases its decision concerning who receives aid on how pervasively
sectarian, i.e. how 'religious' an organization is, a great deal of pressure is exerted upon the
organization to 'tone down' or alter its practice in such a manner as to allow access to the
aid.").
21. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Art Speech, 49 VAND. L. RV. 73, 112-19 (1996)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Art Speech] (discussing the negative impact of government funding
on the art world).
22. See id.
23. See MONSMA, supra note 10, at 80-107; Madison,MemorialandRemonstrance, supra
note 1, at 67-68.
24. Medicare regulations were recently amended so as not to be so obviously sect specific
after they became the subject of a lawsuit and media attention when faith-healing "nurses"
who had trained one week to assist those near death received federal Medicare funding. See
Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 1395-1395zz (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Children's Healthcare is a
Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck, 938 F. Supp. 1466, 1469 (D. Minn. 1996) ("[Most providers of
health care under the Medicare Act are required to meet statutory and regulatory standards
from which Christian Science sanitoria are exempted, and these exemptions form the basis
of their claim under the Medicare Act."). The Senate report that accompanied the
amendment explained that:
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Congress that land use and zoning regulations impose a cost that
violates Free Exercise principles and therefore there should be a
right to trump such laws.' In 1990, Jimmy Swaggart Ministries
argued (unsuccessfully) that it had a right to avoid sales taxes
applied to nonreligious products.26 Professor Michael McConnell,
representing parents of children attending private schools, argued
to the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Helms for a right
to computers and other school support.' In addition to religious
entities, both political parties are now embracing vouchers for
[T]he committee intends that payments to Christian Science sanatoriums would
cover costs of services ordinarily furnished by these sanatoriums to patients
which are comparable to those for which payment could be made to hospitals
and intends these sanatorium services to be a substitute for, and not an
addition to, medical services that might be furnished to a person if his religious
beliefs were not contrary to use of the usual facilities.
S. REP. No. 89404 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1971. Strangely, however,
the statute permits those who do not believe in medical care to make the judgment call on
whether the patient would have qualified for Medicare or Medicaid coverage. See Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle,
212 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-3521), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3410 (Nov.
27, 2000) (No. 00-914).
25. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-274,
2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. (114 Stat.) 803; see also, e.g., 146 CONG. REc. 57774 (daily ed. July 27,
2000) (statement of Senators Hatch and Kennedy); Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Steven T. McFarland, Director, Center for Law and
Religious Freedom, Christian Legal Society); id. at 109-11 (prepared statement of Douglas
Laycock, Associate Dean for Research, University of Texas Law School); id. at 93-94
(prepared statement of Rabbi David Saperstein, Director and Counsel, Religious Action
Center of Reform Judaism); id. at 22-24 (statement ofVon G. Keetch, Counsel, the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints); id. at 55-56 (statement of J. Brent Walker, General
Counsel, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs); Religious Liberty ProtectionAct of 1998:
Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 309 (1999) (statement of
Nathan J. Diament, Director, Institute for Public Affairs, Union of Orthodox Jewish
Congregations ofnAmerica); id. at 27-31 (statement ofElliot M. Mincberg, Vice President and
Legal Director, People for the American Way); id. at 303 (statement of Steven T. McFarland,
Esq., Christian Legal Society).
26. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,384 (1990).
Appellant's central contention is that the State's imposition of sales and use tax
liability on its sale of religious materials contravenes the First Amendment's
command, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, to
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." Appellant challenges the Sales and Use Tax Law under both
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
Id.
27. 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2537 (2000); Reply Brief for Petitioners, Mitchell (No. 98-1648).
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sectarian schools and charitable choice programs that funnel
government money into core, mission activities.2' Then-candidate
George W. Bush, during his acceptance speech for the Republican
Party presidential nomination, went so far as to say that
government cannot handle welfare but rather can be only a
financial partner to religious organizations who can.29 As President,
he has made federal aid to faith-based organizations a centerpiece
of his agenda.
During and after the framing of the Constitution, James Madison
repeatedly warned of the dangers of state support for religious
education and entities.3 ° Many state constitutions banned state
support for sectarian schools, and still contain such provisions."'
Indeed, the recent Florida voucher plan stumbled on just such a
provision. 2 In 1962, Leo Pfeffer declared that "every test of public
opinion discloses that a substantial majority oppose federal aid to
28. See infra Part Il.
29. See Laurie Goodstein, Nudging Church-State Line, Bush Invites Religious Groups to
Seek FederalAid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30,2001, at A18; Governor George W. Bush, Acceptance
Speech, at http'//www.georgewbush.com/News.aspFormMode=SP (last visited Sept. 19,
2000); see also Michael Barone, Religion on the Left, Religion on the Right: Why is 'God Talk'
Becoming a Campaign Staple?, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Aug. 21, 2000, available in 2000
WL 7718560; Deborah Mathis, ReligionMay HaveMore Impact in this Presidential Election,
GANNmiT NEWS SERVIcE, Aug. 21, 2000, available in 2000 WL 4404417 (discussing the
increased presence of religion in the 2000 presidential election).
30. See ElectingRepresentatives (June 6,1787), in THEANTi-FEDERALISTPAPERSANDTHE
CONSTITUTIONALCONVENTIONDEBATES52 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (containing Madison's
warning that [rleligion itself may become a motive to persecution and oppression");
MADALYNMURRAYO'HAI ,FREEDOMUNDERSIEGE: THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED RELIGIONON
YOUR LIBERTY AND YOUR POCKETBOOK 85 (1974) (noting Madison's rationale for writing
Memorial and Remonstrance, as observed in a letter to George Mason dated July 14, 1826:
"In no instance have [ecclesiastical establishments] been the guardians of the liberties of the
people"); Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1 passim.
31. See Murray A. Gordon, The Unconstitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial Schools,
in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 73-74 (Dallin H. Oaks ed., 1963).
32. See Holmes v. Bush, No. CV99-3370, 2000 WL 526364 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2000)
(holding a voucher scheme violative of Article IX, Section 1 of the Florida Consitution). The
Florida Constitution states that:
Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure,
and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a
high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation
of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the
needs of the people may require.
FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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parochial schools."33 In 1963, a church/state lawyer writing for a
collection of essays on separation of church and state asserted the
following:
There is no unequivocal popular consensus for public financing
of church schools. On the contrary, virtually every state has
retained long-standing prohibitions against the use of tax funds
for the construction or maintenance of sectarian schools.
Congress has never directly appropriated money for such a
purpose, and while supporters of federal aid to parochial schools
have combined with those opposed to federal aid for other
reasons to block federal aid to the public schools, it seems clear
that at congressional and executive hearings and conferences
the sense of the public and the authorities has consistently been
that church schools shall not be publicly financed.'
Almost forty years later, the people of the states have continued to
reject public referenda for vouchers."5 But various groups continue
to lobby for vouchers and some local and state government officials
continue to treat them as desirable.
Attitudes toward wealth transfers to religion have not been
constant: the case for tax exemption has waxed and waned over
time.3 6 In 1999, President Clinton extolled the House's passage of
the Religious Liberty Protection Act,3" which would have lifted a
significant measure of the financial burden of zoning regulations
from religious institutions, while in 1875, President Ulysses S.
Grant proposed legislation to amend the Constitution to outlaw
religious property tax exemption, speaking of "the importance of
correcting an evil... the accumulation of vast amounts of untaxed
church property."8 Echoing the views of James Madison a century
33. Leo Pfeffer, FederalFunds forParochial Schools?No., 37 NOTREDAMELAW. 309,309
(1962).
34. Gordon, supra note 31, at 73-74. Gordon dates opposition to public support for
parochial schools at least as far back as 1841. See id. at 79.
35. See Aaron Zitner, Vouchers Lose as Voters Decide Ballot Measures, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
8,2000, at A22.
36. See JOHN WITrE, J&., RELIGION AND THE AMiEIcAN CONsTruTIONAL EXPERIMENT.
EssENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIEs 191,196,202-03 (2000).
37. See David E. Rosenbaum, House Approves Measure on Religious Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 1999, at A16.
38. President Ulysses S. Grant, State ofthe UnionAddress (Dec. 7,1875), in 2 THESTATE
832 [Vol. 42:823
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earlier, Grant held the view that, "'[the separation of Church and
the State' required that all 'legal instruments encouraging
ecclesiastical aggrandizement of wealth and power' including tax
exemptions, be 'expunged."' 9 Ironically, as I will discuss in more
detail below, Grant also took the position that the government
should fund religious missions to the Native Americans in the
1870s, an unsuccessful government initiative.0
The current permissive climate for wealth transfers to religious
entities appears to have resulted from a tangle of social conditions,
including the growth of the federal government's purse,41 the
expansion of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause until
very recently,42 and the Great Society vision that thrust the federal
government into social roles formerly reserved to churches or, at
times, local government." Although there is no study to date on the
relationship between church wealth and willingness to request or
OFTHE UNION MESSAGES OFTHE PRESIDENTS 1790-1966, at 1296 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966).
39. WrITr, supra note 36, at 196 (quoting President Ulysses S. Grant, supra note 38, at
1296). Madison, following his presidency, warned of the "danger of silent accumulations &
encroachments by Ecclesiastical Bodies," saying that they have not "sufficiently engaged
attention in the U.S." LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 121 (1994).
40. See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
41. Cf Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1360-63 (1988)
(examining forms of spending authority that are constitutionally troubling, especially gift
authority).
42. Until Lopez u. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 553-59 (1995), the assumption was that
Congress had carte blanche to enact laws under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, had
legitimate authority to step into the shoes formerly filled by local governments. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-56 (1985) (holding that city
transit authority was not exempt from federal wage and overtime standards enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause).
43. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29,
34-35 (1999) (contrastingwhat the author considers President Clinton's "New Constitutional
Order" with Roosevelt's New Deal/Great Society order). Tushnet states:
The nation needed a Second Bill ofRights, according to the constitutionalvision
of the New Deal/Great Society regime, because combining background rules of
propertyrights with the first Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction amendments
failed adequately to promote human flourishing. Racial segregation had to be
overcome by aggressive policies of national support for the aspirations of
African-Americans; economic inequality had to be addressed through a War on
Poverty;, the travails of old age hadto be reduced by providing health care to the
elderly through the Medicare program.
Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
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accept government funding, the increase in lobbying power of
organized religion by banding together,4 and the current fiscal
crisis of the mainline churches may be a factor in the push for
greater wealth transfer from government to religion.45 Even though
some mainline churches have eschewed such benefits, 46 the general
sense that churches are financially ailing may have had an effect on
politicians' readiness to provide government financial benefits to
religion. There is also the age-old phenomenon of the willingness of
politicians not only to be photographed with religious leaders but to
actively and publicly seek their counsel. This is a stance perfected
by President Clinton,'7 but employed by a wide range of politicians
in this era.48 Politicians' current attitude toward religion is thus
both a cause and an effect of the current phenomenon of increasing
governmental aid to religion. Pending legislation in Congress and
the states portends further enrichment of religious entities by the
government.' 9
This Article examines the current wealth transfer to religion
from three perspectives. First, in Part I, this Article explains James
Madison's views on wealth transfers to religion, which offer both an
44. See MarciA. Hamilton, Religion andtheLaw in the Clinton Era:AnAnti-Madisonian
Legacy, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 359,372-89 (2000) [hereinafter Hamilton, Clinton Era].
45. See generally DEANR. HOGE ETAL.,MONEYMATIERS: PERSONAL GIVINGINAMERICAN
CHURCHES (1996) (detailing a study regarding religious giving); ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE
CRISIS IN THE CHURCHES: SPIRITUALMALAISE, FISCALWOE (1997) (discussing the fiscal crisis
churches face).
46. See, e.g., Religious Liberty Action Network, Preserve OurReligiousLiberty, Religious
Action Center of Reform Judaism, at http://www.rj.org/rac/religiousliberty (last visited Sept.
19,2000) (discussing the Istook Amendment, which would have allowed "school prayer and
government funding of religious institutions"); The Coalition to Preserve Religious Liberty,
Member Organizations, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, at
http//www.rj.org/rac/religiousliberty/memb.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2000) (listing
mainline churches opposed to the Istook Amendment); see also Baptist Joint Committee on
Public Affairs, Resolution on Public Financial Aid to Parochial Schools, at
http:/www.bjcpa.org/timely/pubaidres.html (last visited Sept. 19,2000) (opposing public aid
for parochial schools).
47. For a fuller discussion of the relationship between President Clinton and religious
entities, see Hamilton, Clinton Era, supra note 44.
48. See, e.g., Milo Ippolito, Influential Marietta Baptist Pastor Says He'll Retire, Nelson
Price Set to Leave Church After 35 Years, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 10, 2000, at B1,
available in 2000 WL 5451247 (noting the retirement of a prominent clergyman whose
"counsel also has been sought by area elected officials," including U.S. Representative
Johnny Isakson).
49. See legislation cited infra note 68.
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antidote to the current permissive era and meaningful guidance.
Second, Part II analyzes the issue of accountability, government
funding, and religious institutions from two real-world perspectives.
First, it employs the recent legal disputes in the context of
government arts funding to illustrate the dynamics of government
funding of First Amendment-protected entities. Because art and
religion play similar roles in the constitutional scheme, these cases
are instructive.5" These cases make clear that Madison's concerns
about funding First Amendment-protected activities continue to be
relevant. Part II then turns to an example in which the government
used funding to religious entities to avoid accountability: President
Grant's "Peace Policy." Finally, in Part III, this Article documents
the ride down the slippery slope feared by Madison by describing
four arenas in which wealth transfer to religion recently has
increased or newly appeared: sectarian school support, tax-exempt
status, direct handouts, and mission support, popularly referred to
as "charitable choice."
This Article eschews the Court's religion doctrine to focus on
translating Madison's thesis on church and state into contemporary
practice. It is intended to be a return to first principles. The reader
is left to judge whether it comports with past, current, or future
doctrine, and what doctrinal "fixes" might be desirable.
I. MADISON'S THESIS
In the epigraph at the opening of this Article, Madison declared
that not even three pence should be paid by the government in
support of a church.5 At other times, he objected to other relatively
small expenditures for religion on the grounds that they violated
the Constitution's structure and provisions, including pay for a
congressional chaplain. 2 As President, Madison vetoed several bills
he thought violated the principle of disestablishment.53 Later, strict
50. See Hamilton, Art Speech, supra note 21, at 80-86.
51. See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, at 65.
52. Madison's opposition to Henry's Virginia proposal, "Establishing a Provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion," eventually became hisMemorial andRemonstrance. See
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 71-72 (1998).
53. See ia. at 84 (noting "ecclesiastical encroachments" that President Madison vetoed,
including: "a congressional bill in 1811 to incorporate the Episcopal church in Alexandria
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separationists, like Justice Douglas and Justice Jackson, took
Madison's meaning literally, only to be told that such severe
separation is unreasonable and unattainable. Justice Jackson,
dissenting from the majority inEverson v. Board ofEducation, said:
"This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in
the forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its
strength is its rigidity."' Similarly, in his dissent in Walz v. Tax
Commission, Justice Douglas noted that "subsidies either through
direct grant or tax exemption for sectarian causes, whether carried
on by church qua church or by church qua welfare agency, must be
treated differently, lest we in time allow the church qua church to
be on the public payroll, which, I fear, is imminent.""5 The Walz
majority rejected Douglas's bright-line approach, holding that a
New York City-based property tax exemption of real property,
which was owned by religious organizations and used only for
religious worship, did not violate the Establishment Clause: "The
course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an
absolutely straight line ....
Madison's message, though, was more nuanced than a simple
rule against any funding for religious entities. His message instead
was that small amounts of funding could open the way to further,
larger funding. Three pence was the top of a slippery and steep
slope. The Virginia bill, proposing federal funding for teachers of
Christianity, "[d]istant as it may be, in its present form, from the
Inquisition it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step,
the other the last in the career of intolerance." 7 At the bottom of
that slope, according to Madison, was a disintegration of the
distinct identities of church and state and a corresponding
weakening of their respective, constructive roles in society."
"Madison argued that establishment of religion weakened the
beliefs of adherents so favored, strengthened their opponents, and
generated 'pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and
[and] a bill also in 1811 to reserve land in the Mississippi territory for a Baptist church").
Madison's opposition also led to the defeat of "a bill in Kentucky to exempt Houses of
Worship from taxes." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
54. 330 U.S. 1, 26 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
55. 397 U.S. 664, 711 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 669.
57. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, at 69.
58. See id. at 66.
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servility in the laity; [and] in both, superstition, bigotry, and
persecution." 9
A Madisonian Constitutional Fundamentals-Distrust
The primary premise of the Framers, and especially Madison,
was that every entity should be distrusted, because everyindividual
and entity has the capacity to abuse its power.6 0 This was a society-
wide shared assessment of human nature, borrowed in no small
part from the Calvinist tradition." His solution for this bedrock
problem was to advocate factionalism-everyone was safer if
collectives were relatively small and squared off against each
other.62 Conversely, tyranny was most likely to result from large
59. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530,2574 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, at 67).
60. Wherever the Framers looked, they accepted as a fact that men could and would use
their power to accomplish evil, rather than good: "From the nature of man we may be sure,
that those who have power in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it. On the
contrarywe know theywill always when they can rather increase it."JAMESMADISON,NOTES
OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 266 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987)
(statement of George Mason) [hereinafter MADIsON,NOTES OFDEBATES]. In James Madisons
words, "The truth was that all men having power ought to be distrusted to a certain degree."
Id at 272; see also id. at 288 (statement of Elbridge Gerry) ("They will if they acquire power
like all men, abuse it."). Madison referred to the "landmarks of power." LEVY,
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, supra note 39, at 123.
There was broad consensus on the end to be avoided-tyranny from any social center of
power. The Framers typically focused on the choice of the best means to avoid tyranny. All
those with power were assumed to be interested in exceeding their authority. See MADISON,
NOTES OF DEBATES, supra at 193 (statement of James Madison) ("In order to judge of the
form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served
by it. These were first to protect the people ag[ainlst their rulers... ."); id. at 133 (statement
of Alexander Hamilton) ("The members of [Congress] being chosen by the States & subject
to recall, represent all the local prejudices... till a tyrannic sway shall be established."); id.
at 197 (statement of James Wilson) (referring to "tyranny"); id. at 279 (statement of Edmund
Randolph) (referring to legislatures' propensity to "perpetuate [their] power"); id. at 323
(statement of Governeur Morris) (referring to "love of power... oppression").
Thus, this new national government the Framers were crafting was constructed on the
presupposition that its power was likely to be misused. See id. at 43-44. To avoid undue
concentrations ofpower, the Framers sought to achieve a balance ofpower between identified
social entities. See Hamilton, The People, supra note 12, at 3-5 (discussing images of solar
system and clock).
61. See generally Marci A. Hamilton, The Reformed Constitution: Representation,
Calvinism, and Congressional Responsibility 4-11 (Nov. 20,2000) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the author) [hereinafter Hamilton, Reformed Constitution].
62. In an article defending vouchers, Professor Stephen Macedo makes the strange point
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concentrations of power, including when smaller collectives join
together to achieve one end.6"
Following his fundamental premises, Madison trusted neither the
state nor the church to forego tyranny when left to their own
devices. Each needed a check to achieve the balance of power that
would lead to liberty for the people.64 His conviction on this score
became deeper as his career advanced through the presidency, at
the end of which he declared that the most serious, underexamined
issue in America was the accumulation of power and wealth by
religious entities.65 On Madison's reasoning, the savvy citizen ought
to fear overreaching by either church or state and understand that
both are capable of tyranny. "The preservation of a free government
requires not merely, that the metes and bounds which separate
each department of power may be invariably maintained; but more
especially, that neither of them be suffered to overleap the great
Barrier which defends the rights of the people."66 He knew the
United States was attempting a new balance of power between
church and state, saying that "[it remained for North America to
bring the great & interesting subject [church and state and the
voluntary support of religion] to a fair, and finally to a decisive
test."
67
that Madison would have approved of a concept of civil society in which there is a national
morality at work and a national school system composed of private and public schools
operating under the same moral precepts. See Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society:
School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75 CM.-
KENT L. REV. 417, 421-23 (2000). This is directly contrary to Madison's endorsement of
factionalism and the safety it brings. While Madison's views could be read consistently with
a civil society theory that required the presence of a multiplicity of differing sects and
organizations, they cannot be squared with a single, national morality, a totalistic view much
more akin to Friedrich Hegel than Madison.
63. See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, at 65 ("True it is, that no
other rule exists, by which any question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately
determined, but the will of the majority; but it is also true, that the majority may trespass
on the rights of the minority."); see also Hamilton, Clinton Era, supra note 44, at 362
("[Madison] believed that a number of individual sects is vastly preferable to a 'majority
united by a common interest or passion,' which places the 'rights of the minority in danger.-m
(quoting MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 60, at 76)).
64. See Hamilton, Vouchers, supra note 4, at 811-14.
65. See LEVY, supra note 39, at 121.
66. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, at 65.
67. 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 485 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
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The spirit of Madison's warnings is but a small part of
contemporary discourse. His deep understanding of the ability of
religion and government to overstep their bounds has been swept
under the rug as legislators of this era rush to hand religion
whatever it requests.6" Religion, in its current genesis, is
whitewashed as a do-good, trustworthy collective that can only
assist the development of a moral fiber the government has
68. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42
U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. IV 1998) (allowing the states to "administer and provide services ...
through contracts with charitable, religious, or private organizations"); Medicare Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(-RFRA!), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994), invalidated by City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997); Community Services Block Grant Program, 42 U.S.C. § 9920 (Supp. IV 1998)
("Mhe government shall consider, on the same basis as other nongovernmental
organizations, religious organizations to provide assistance under the program, so long as
the program is implemented in a manner consistent with the Establishment Clause.. .. );
Fathers Count Act of 1999, H.R. 3073, 106th Cong. § 403A (1999) (making grants for
fatherhood programs available to public and private entities); Charitable Choice Expansion
Act of 1999, S. 1113, 106th Cong. (1999) (intending, inter alia, to "prohibit discrimination
againstnongovernmental organizations and certain individuals on the basis ofreligioninthe
distribution of government funds to provide government assistance and the distribution of
the assistance," and "to allow the organizations to accept the funds to provide the assistance
to the individuals without impairing the religious character of the organizations or the
religious freedom of the individuals"); Charity Empowerment Act of 1999, H.R. 1607,106th
Cong. (1999) (proposing legislation similar to that of the Charitable Choice Expansion Act);
S. 997, 106th Cong. (1999) (same); Youth Drug and Mental Health Services Act of 1999, S.
REP. No. 106-196, at 100 (1999) (prohibiting discrimination against religiously-based
substance abuse programs and allowing such organizations to accept funding without
"impairing the religious character of the organizations or the religious freedom of the
individuals"). See generally Hamilton, Reformed Constitution, supra note 61, at 100-01, 110-
13 (discussing "look-good, feel-good" legislation).
The Charitable Choice Expansion Act of 1999 suggests further that
any program carried out by the Federal Government, or by a State or local
government with Federal fumds, in which the Federal, State, or local
government is authorized to use nongovernmental organizations, through
contracts, grants, certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement, to
provide assistance to beneficiaries under the program, the government shall
consider, on the same basis as other nongovernmental organizations, religious
organizations to provide the assistance under the program, so long as the
program is implemented in amanner consistentwith the Establishment Clause
of the first amendment to the Constitution. Neither the Federal Government
nor a State or local government receiving funds under such program shall
discriminate against an organization that provides assistance under, or applies
to provide assistance under, such program, on the basis that the organization
has a religious character.
S. 1113, 106th Cong. § 1944A(c) (1999).
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despaired of providing.69 While many religions do beneficial and
good works, close analysis shows neither religion nor government
has changed since the framing so as to deserve this sort of
unreflective trust. While religion's requests for privilege from
generally applicable laws and for government funding have
increased apace, government has shown itself unfit to fund First
Amendment-protected interests in the arts cases and in its
nineteenth-century dealings with the Native American tribes. On
a Madisonian reading, each is acting true to form and the
Constitution is the tool to bring them back within safe parameters.
In sum, Madison reasoned that all wealth transfers to religion
are dangerous: whether they are small or large and whether they
are direct or indirect. This era has departed far from his platform
of distrust.
B. Madisonian Constitutional Fundamentals-The Role of the
Representative
To fully apprehend the role of the Establishment Clause, it is
helpful to grasp the role of the federal legislator. The First
Amendment, after all, is specifically directed to Congress, and
Madison was one of the primary influences on the shape of
69. This whitewashing has occurred in both the White House and Congress. See
Hamilton, Clinton Era, supra note 44, at 361 ("President Clinton routinely whitewashes
religion, treating it as an undifferentiated force for good [and] actively encourages religious
lobbyists to join together to increase their power in the political process and to raise their
voices in the public square, including the international public square.").
Charitable Choice is intended to allay... fears and to prevent government
officials from misconstruing constitutional law by banning faith-based
organizations from the mix of private providers for fear of violating the
Establishment Clause. Even when religious organizations are permitted to
participate, government officials have often gone overboard by requiring such
organizations to sterilize buildings or property of religious character and to
remove any sectarian connections from their programs. This discrimination can
destroy the character of many faith-based programs and diminish their
effectiveness in helping people climb from despair and dependence to dignity
and independence.
145 CONG. REC. S13845, S13859 (daily ed. Nov. 3,1999) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft). But see
NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN
AMERICA 15 (1998) (stating that "t]here is no systematic answer to whether we can depend
on the associations of civil society to cultivate the moral dispositions liberal democracy
requires").
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representation as well as the drafter of the First Amendment.7" The
constitutional scheme is premised on a representative structure in
which representatives are not controlled by the people. Rather, the
people have the power to choose their representatives through
voting, and the power to communicate with them through the
Publications Clauses,7 ' the Speech and Debate Clause,72 and the
First Amendment's Speech and Press Clauses.7" Representatives
are quite independent of the people in the sense that the deci-
sions a representative reaches during her term of office are
constitutionally legitimate even if the people expressly disagree. 74
Thus, the representative is placed in the role of a trustee to the
people. As trustee, she is expected, if the system is to work as the
Framers hoped it would, to make decisions in the general interest
of the people. That frame of mind is supposed to become a habitual
attitude of responsibility, accountability, and service. Although
many may fall short, Madison believed that the system would not
succeed if enough of those chosen to be representatives were not
individuals of virtue.75 The reason virtue was so necessary lay in
the extent of the people's delegation of lawmaking power to their
representatives.
The trustee relationship can work in the interest of the polity for
the vast majority of topics that cross a representative's desk. The
Bill of Rights, however, warns members of Congress not to take this
paternalistic or trustee role vis-a-vis the people in certain specified
arenas. They may, and should, race to the people's aid to protect
them from fire, violence, and bad roads, to name a few examples,
but they may not protect the people from religions, ideas, or speech
70. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ."); see also Hamilton, Reformed
Constitution, supra note 61, at 61 (discussing Madison).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its
Proceedings .... ."); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
72. Id. art. I, § 6, cL 1 ("[Aind for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not
be questioned in any other Place.").
73. Id. amend. I.
74. See Hamilton, Reformed Constitution, supra note 61, at 75, 82-84; Hamilton,
Proposal, supra note 13, at 523-24; Hamilton, The People, supra note 12, at 9.
75. See also Hamilton, Reformed Constitution, supra note 61, at 15 ("Virtue in those
serving the people by representing them is in fact the fulcrum on which the entire
constitutional system rests.").
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some believe are wrong, inappropriate, or unpopular.76 Thus, it is
fair to say that the Constitution's representative structure actually
predisposes the members of Congress to cross the constitutional
line in the arena of religion or speech: the more seriously a
representative takes the duty of care owed to her constituents, the
more likely she will find herself criticizing religion or art on behalf
of all or some constituents, including religious constituents.
Although this structural predisposition is no excuse for the
member of Congress, it does help to explain how the Establishment
Clause is continually violated by members of Congress who are led
across constitutional barriers by powerful political rhetoric. This
phenomenon of the structure of representation also makes clear the
First Amendment's absolute necessity as a guard against legislative
reaching beyond prescribed, enumerated categories.
Under Madison's vision, each wealth transfer discussed in this
Article raises serious Establishment Clause concerns. Tax
exemptions for real property used by religious organizations and
direct aid for school supplies already have been upheld by the Court
on the grounds that the former has been in place for many years
and the latter is not really a transfer of wealth to religious
entities.7 The other three wealth transfers discussed-direct
handouts, vouchers, and charitable choice-raise more troubling
Establishment Clause problems. The combined novelty and
magnitude of each wealth transfer ought to break the spell cast by
the transformation of "free" in free exercise from "liberty" to
"costless."
II. ACCOUNTABILITY, GOVERNMENT FUNDING, AND RELIGIOUS
ENTITIES
A. Lessons for Religion and the Government from the Arts Wars
The arts cases illustrate that the price and risk of government
funding of works protected by the First Amendment is
extraordinarily high. Without doubt, the Framers' concern that all
76. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531-32 (1993); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,382 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 408-09 (1989); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869-72 (1982).
77. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671-72, 676-80 (1970).
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entities would abuse their power is heightened when money enters
the picture. True to Madison's vision, entities must work hard to
retain their separate identities once the government has instituted
a funding program.78 This is true whether the government is state
or federal.
1. The Federal Government and Arts Funding: NEA v. Finley
Government labors under an obligation to serve the people and,
in order for public officials to retain their positions and credibility,
they must take into account the views of the people. This feature
was built into the representative system by the Framers,79 and
creates both an incentive system for government officials to
condemn that which is unpopular or harmful to any group, as well
as a platform for voicing those views.80 When the "people's money"
is being used in a way that would offend or hurt particular persons
or groups, the representative is strongly tempted to: 1) criticize how
the money was spent; 2) seize control of the current project created
with the money; and 3) take measures to ensure it never happens
again. Though at odds with the First Amendment, and properly
condemned when the subject is speech or religion, these are natural
78. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
79. See generally Hamilton, Reformed Constitution, supra note 61, at 69-70.
80. Thisphenomenonisusualyidentifiedintheliterature as "majoritarianism," but that
term is in fact misleading. The representative system in place does not permit majorities of
the people to prevail, and in fact gives no combination of the people the power to make law.
Rather, a system of independent representation was chosen by the Framers expressly to
guard against majoritarianism. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). Speaking of
the need for republican government, Madison invoked the potential evils of religion when he
wrote to Thomas Jefferson that:
When Indeed Religion is kindled into enthusiasm, its force like that of other
passions is increased by the sympathy of a multitude.... Even in its coolest
state, it has been much oftener motive to oppression than a restraint from it.
If then there must be different interests and parties in Society, and a majority
when united by a common interest or passion can not [sic] be restrained from
oppressing the minority, what remedy can be found in a republican
Government, where the majority must ultimatelydecide, but that ofgiving such
an extent of its sphere, that no common interest or passion will be likely to
unite a majority of the whole number in an unjust pursuit.
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in FEDERALISTS AND
ANTIFEDERAMSTS: THE DEBATE OVER RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 202 (John P.
Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 2d ed., Constitutional Heritage Series Vol. 1, 1998); see also
Hamilton, Proposal, supra note 13, at 523-27.
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consequences flowing from the representative's obligation to
represent the people's best interests.
In a nonspeech context, this temptation is perfectly acceptable.
For example, suppose a county used its tax funds to build a
structurally weak bridge that led to the death of a person. Local
officials (assuming they were not the cause) rightly would condemn
the bridge builders, seize control of the bridge to correct the harm,
and promise that it would never happen again. Similarly, a local
government could institute a school lunch program, which is run by
a contractor that serves food with ants in it. Upon discovery of the
problem, local officials would immediately condemn the contractor,
seize control of the program until they could find a more reliable
contractor, and promise to ensure it would never happen again.
Once again, this is the way the system is supposed to work. When
financing of non-First Amendment activities is involved, like
bridges and school lunches, it is called "accountability" and is
constitutionally legitimate.
Enter the First Amendment, particularly government funding of
the arts, and the government's trustee role becomes uncon-
stitutional. Even where such funding starts with the best of
content-and-viewpoint-neutral intentions,8 ' art's instrumental
function of challenging status quo assumptions 2 drives government
officials to castigate and single out certain artistic creations and to
find measures to ensure similar creations are never funded again.
Like most government funding programs, the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) is rooted in mixed motives. On the
one hand, it was based on a content-and-viewpoint-neutral policy.
On the other hand, it was intended to empower certain views over
unpopular views. As to the former, the NEA began as an institution
to:
enable groups and individuals to provide or support in the
United States (1) productions which have substantial artistic
and cultural significance, giving emphasis to American
creativity and the maintenance and encouragement of
professional excellence; (2) other productions, irrespective of
81. Frequently-perhaps usually-funding of the arts is not content-and-viewpoint-
neutral.
82. See Hamilton, Art Speech, supra note 21, at 101.
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origin, which meet professional standards or standards of
authenticity and are of significant merit, and which, without
such assistance, would otherwise be unavailable to our citizens
in many areas of the country; (3) projects that will encourage
and assist artists and enable them to achieve standards of
professional excellence; (4) workshops that will encourage and
develop the appreciation and enjoyment of the arts by our
citizens; and (5) other relevant projects, including surveys,
research, and planning in the arts."
At the time of the NEA's enactment, there was a general sense,
still shared by some, that great cultures throughout history have
funded the arts and therefore the United States should as well. 84
Beneath this neutral veneer, however, there was also an explicit
intention to fund "American" artworks for the purpose of
"overcom[ing] the increasing 'cultural offensive' being waged by
Communist ideologies."85
It should come as no surprise that what began as an attempt to
drown out Communism turned into a ready tool to suppress other
unpopular viewpoints. In the 1980s and 1990s, members of
Congress decried particular artworks funded by the NEA that they
perceived to be offensive to some constituencies, especially works
with sexual or religious content.86 These works led government
83. H.R.REP.No. 89-618, at 7 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186,3192; see also
20 U.S.C. § 953(a) (1994) (establishing a National Foundation on the Arts and the
Humanities, including a National Endowment for the Arts, a National Endowment for the
Humanities, a Federal Council on the Arts and the Humanities, and an Institute of Museum
Services).
84. See H.R. REP. No. 89-618, at 5 ("The broad-based programs envisaged by the
Foundation would serve not only to deepen our understanding of our friends and allies
throughouttheworld, butwould strengthentheprojectionofourNation's cultural life abroad
... ."). See also David Cole's remarks in Symposium: Art, Distribution & the State:
Perspectives on the National Endowment for the Arts, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 705,743
(1999):
I believe it is important to have public fumding of expression generally, and I do
not think artistic expression is any exception. A lot of expression cannot be
funded in the private marketplace, but is nonetheless very valuable .... I think
it is also important, however, that it not be driven by political pressures to
become an art of majoritarian values. That was said by virtually everybody
when they created the NEA thirty years ago.
85. H.R. REP. No. 89-618, at 5.
86. NEA-funded works drawing ire included the performance art of the petitioners in
National Endowment for the Arts u. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), Robert Mapplethorpe's This
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officials to follow the same pattern they would have followed with
a faulty bridge or an ant-infested school lunch: condemn, gain
control of the particular works, and institute procedures to ensure
it never happens again.
The condemnations were in no uncertain terms:
While it may be true that only a handful of the 85,000 projects
which received grants from the National Endowment for the
Arts during its 25-year history are the focus of the current
opposition to its reauthorization, the fact is that the public's
views should prevail and that works that conflict with current
standards of decency should not receive Federal funds, either
directly or indirectly.
[We should not be providing funds from the National
Endowment for the Arts that are used to produce or to exhibit
works that a significant number of people consider obscene or
indecent.
We are not talking about limiting freedom of speech or
expression. We are talking about how American taxpayers'
dollars should be used. 7
Similarly:
I do not believe the government is obligated to pay for so-called
art which deliberately denigrates religious, racial, or ethnic
groups or belief of this country-works which degrade the very
principles for which this government stands.
If an individual wants to engage in that denigration on his own
with his own money and it is within the limits of present law,
then he certainly has that right. But, I believe the government
has no obligation to fund those kinds of projects."
Perfect Moment, and Andres Serrano's Piss Christ.
87. H.R. REP. No. 101-566, at 37-38 (1990) (dissenting views of Hon. Joseph M. Gaydos
and Hon. AustinJ. Murphy in opposition to H.R. 4825, the authorization billforthe NEA and
related agencies). In their remarks, Mr. Gaydos and Mr. Murphy referred specifically to the
works of Robert Mapplethorpe, Andres Serrano, the performance art of Annie Springle, and
an exhibition by David Wojinarowicz. See id. at 37.
88. Id. at 41 (dissenting views of Hon. Glenn Poshard on H.R. 4825).
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There were various proposals to "deal" with the works, some of
which involved suppression. Others proposed amendments to the
NEA's grant-authorizing process. 9
In the end, Congress took it upon itself to correct the NEA's grant
procedures to ensure its members were not put in this position
again. In late 1990, it enacted an amendment, subsequently
challenged in Finley, requiring the NEA to ensure that "artistic
excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications
are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public."9 0
The constitutional difference between the bridge and lunch
examples and NEA-funded artworks is, of course, the First
Amendment. What public officials must do in the public interest
with respect to bridges and lunches, it may not do to First
Amendment-protected speech, like art.91 When artists instituted a
facial challenge to the NEA guidelines, the Court upheld the
guidelines on the ground that there might be certain circumstances,
e.g., art directed at children, in which a viewpoint discriminatory,
"decency" criterion could be constitutionally acceptable.92 The Court
89. See id. at 43 (individual views of E. Thomas Coleman); id. at 44 (additional views of
Paul B. Henry). Coleman proposed reforms which "increased accountability to the public
whose tax funds support the Endowment." Id. at 43. Rep. Henry suggested an amendment
to H.R. 4825:
The Chairperson and the National Council for the Arts shall ensure that any
project supported by an award, grant, loan, or other form of support provided
by the Endowment demonstrates a commitment to artistic excellence which is
sensitive to the nature of public sponsorship, and does not deliberately
denigrate the cultural heritage of the United States, its religious traditions, or
racial or ethnic groups. The Chairperson and the National Council for the Arts
shall ensure that any project supported by an award, grant, loan or other form
of support provided by the Endowment does not violate prevailing standards
against obscenity or indecency.
Id. at 44.
90. Department ofthe Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 101-512, § 103(bXd)(1), 104 Stat. 1915,1963-64 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 954(dX1) (1994)).
91. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546,557-58 (1975); Joseph Burstyn, Inc.
v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,510 (1948); Bery
v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996).
92. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584 (1998).
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made it clear, however, that such viewpoint discrimination would
violate the First Amendment in other scenarios."
In sum, the grant of federal money leads inevitably to
governmental attempts to control how that money is allotted. This
relationship is the nature of the structure of government and the
reason the First Amendment is necessary. The same reasoning
holds true at the local level and even when government money does
not go directly to the creation of new art.
2. Local Government and Arts Funding: Brooklyn Institute
Versus Giuliani
New York City provides certain support services to a number of
artistic organizations, including security and maintenance.94 The
City does not directly fund the creation of artworks. 5 Instead, for
example, the Brooklyn Art Museum has absolute title to anything
in its collection.96 The dispute between the Brooklyn Museum and
the New York City Administration follows the same pattern as that
described in the NEA context: condemnation, censorship, and
extraordinary measures to prevent such expression in the future.
The Brooklyn Arts Museum has received city funds for
maintenance and security for over 100 years.97 Whenit mounted the
93. The Court in Finley stated that an as-applied challenge, in which the government
engaged in specific viewpoint discrimination, might allege a First Amendment violation. The
Court warned that"even in the provision of subsidies, the Government may not 'ai[m] at the
suppression of dangerous ideas,' and if a subsidy were 'manipulated' to have a 'coercive
effect,' then relief could be appropriate." Id. at 587 (citations omitted).
94. New York City's contract with the Brooklyn Museum provides that the Citywill fund
maintenance and security of the building, including "(1) repairs and alternations; (2) fuel;
(3) waste removal; (4) wages of employees providing essential maintenance, custodial,
security and other basic services; (5) cleaning and general care; (6) tools and supplies; and
(7) insurance for the building, furniture, and fixtures." Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences
v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
95. See id. at 189 ("City funds generally 'are not used for direct curatorial or artistic
services.'").
96. See id. at 188 ("The Contract is unequivocal that the City has no ownership rights
with respect to any of the collections in the Museum-").
97. The then-City of Brooklyn leased the land on which the museum now stands to the
Brooklyn Museum on December 23, 1893, for a 100-year term. See id. at 187. Upon
completion of the building, the two parties entered into the contract described supra note 94.
See id. at 187-89. Although the lease expired in 1993, the Museum has remained tenant in
possession based on the terms contained in the original lease and contract. See id. at 188.
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"Sensation" exhibit in the fall of 1999, which included a painting of
the Madonna that incorporated elephant dung and pornographic
cutouts, New York City Mayor Rudolf Giuliani attacked the
Museum because of his perception that the exhibit offended
Catholic sensibilities."
Giuliani followed the predictable pattern: condemnation,
suppression, and then consideration of how to prevent the same in
the future. First, he repeatedly condemned the specific painting and
the exhibition in general, saying that the painting was
sacrilegious.9" Second, he directed the Museum to remove the
painting, and attempted to have the Board of Trustees unseated
and the Museum's lease terminated."° Third, he laid the
groundwork for future attacks on artworks that offended certain
constituencies' sensibilities. He declared his intention to visit every
museum receiving City money for the purpose of reviewing
content,"0 ' and he promised to engage in the same aggressive tactics
if any future museum showed artworks offensive to any religious
group. 0
2
Most remarkable about the government's response to "Sensation"
was the fact that the City had not funded the creation or even the
transportation of the works it attempted to suppress.0° Rather, the
City Administration perceived that it had an obligation to the public
to distance itself from the art because public funds had paid some
of the Museum's overhead. Thus, the instinct of public officials to
claim the control that follows from public funding extends well
beyond direct or complete funding of a project. As the City's
98. See id. at 190-91.
99. MayorGiulianicalledthe artwork"adesecrationofrelgion,"DavidBarstow, Giuliani
Ordered to Restore Funds for Art Museum, N.Y. Tims, Nov. 2,1999, at Al, B5; he said the
exhibit was an "attack on religion," Ralph Blumenthal & CarolVogel, Museum Says Giuliani
Knew of Show in July and Was Silent, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,1999, at B1, B8; and stated further
that the exhibit "desecrated [the] Christian faith," BriefAmicus Curiae ofVolunteerLawyers
for the Arts et al. at 4, Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences v. City ofNew York (No. 99-9326)
[hereinafter Brief ofVolunteerLawyers] (2d Cir. on appeal from 64 F. Supp. 2d 184 (E.D.N.Y.
1999), dismissed pursuant to settlement agreement Mar. 27,2000) (on file with the author).
100. See Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
101. See Michael R. Blood, Mayor Hints at Screening forMore Art, N.Y. DAILYNEWs, Oct.
6, 1999, at 26, available in LEXIS, News Library, DLYNWS File.
102. See Brief of Volunteer Lawyers, supra note 99, at 5-6; Elisabeth Bumiller, Giuliani
Says He'd Defend Other Faiths Against Offensive Art, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1999, at B8.
103. See Brooklyn Inst. of Arts and Sciences, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 202.
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draconian response in the Brooklyn Institute case illustrates, the
consequent threat to First Amendment interests is not
insubstantial.
What looked to be a boon for government support of the arts has
turned out to be an entre for government control and suppression.
With some plausibility (even if unconstitutional) and apparent
inevitability, government will attempt to control how its money is
spent, even when the money is flowing to First Amendment-
protected entities or works. Religion is no different from art on this
score.
B. Lessons from President Grant's "Peace Policy"
Even though the structure of representation entrusts elected
representatives with paternalistic oversight of most problems and
builds in accountability, there are numerous instances in which
representatives do not embrace their responsibilities. Rather, it
may be politically expedient to delegate the hard work of the
trustee to others.
The preceding section depicted the impropriety under the First
Amendment of government acting out its trustee role by insisting
on accountability for the expenditure of public funds. This section
shows the other side of the problem of government aid to First
Amendment protected activities: what happens when government
provides the money but washes its hands of oversight over the use
of the money? There is a historical example that illustrates how
this set of factors operates: President Ulysses S. Grant's "Peace
Policy" for the Native Americans.' °4
The Peace Policy emerged after the Civil War, under the
administration of President Ulysses S. Grant (1869-77), as a means
of assimilating, or Christianizing, the Indians into white society."0 5
The stated policy goal was "conquering [the Indians] with
104. See generally HENRYE. FIT, THEMOVEMENTFORINDIANASSIMILATION, 1860-1890,
at 56-86 (1963) (discussing the Peace Policy and attempts to assimilate Native Americans
into Anglo-American culture); ROBERT WINSTON MARDocK, THE REFORMERS AND THE
AMERICANINDIAN47-128(1971) (discussingthe Peace Policy andthe socialforces influencing
U.S.-Native American policy during the post-Civil War period).
105. See FRITZ, supra note 104, at 79.
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kindness."" 6 In 1869, when Grant took office, the "Indian policy"
was in shambles. Religious leaders convinced Congress to
appropriate $2 million for Indian affairs and created the citizen
Board of Indian Commissioners, whose ten members were
appointed by Grant from various religious denominations, with the
Society of Friends taking a leading role.' The Peace Policy
involved reservations administered by religious organizations with
funds appropriated by the government. Religious "agents" were
assigned particular reservations.'
The federal government, after setting up the Peace Policy, left the
fate of the Native Americans, who desperately needed food,
education, and agrarian training, to the religious organizations.
Two results accrued. First, Congress did not authorize adequate
funds for the agents to fulfill their mission and educational goals,
and the religious organizations did not, for whatever reason, fill the
funding gap themselves. The tragic result was starvation and
although the Native Americans were religiously trained, they did
not receive the necessary agrarian training they needed to avoid
further starvation. 9 The combination of insufficient funding,
interchurch quarreling, Indian discontent and starvation, western
bandits, illegal liquor trafficking, and a failed attempt at a legal
system with which to resolve disputes on the reservations created
insurmountable obstacles for the religious administrators."0
As both Congress and the President lost interest in Indian
affairs, partly as a result of public opinion against Indian
uprisings,"' the citizen Board of Indian Commissioners lost all of
its original members, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs became
corrupt and bureaucratically disabled." The relationship between
government and religious organizations became so strainedby 1880
that the denominations began to withdraw from the Peace Policy,
and it was soon discredited during the administration of President
Rutherford B. Hayes."'
106. I at 64.
107. See id. at 73-75.
108. See id. at 75-79.
109. See id. at 135.
110. See id at 135-67.
111. See id. at 137.
112. See id. at 152-62.
113. See 1d. at 101-04.
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Second, there was a great deal of denominational conflict between
religious entities regarding which sect was assigned to which
reservations. The Roman Catholics were the most exercised,
because their active ministry to the Native Americans was not
taken into account in the original reservation assignments. 5 The
intersect war escalated quickly into charges of bigotry and
discrimination by the Catholics," 6 while other sects fought over
which reservations they were assigned."' On all of the reservations,
the particular religious sect indoctrinated the Native Americans
into their faith.18
The government funding of religious mission in the Peace Policy
shows a government throwing funds at a social problem as it
declares that government cannot itself solve the problem. Thus,
government avoided taking direct responsibility for the fate of the
Native Americans through the convenient displacement of
responsibility with money. Having allocated some funds to the
problem and having handed the difficult part to religious sects, the
federal government washed its hands of the Native Americans, and
allocated its resources to other, more politically pressing issues."'
The result of government withdrawal from the policy field was
destructive, interdenominational conflict, and a failure to ensure
that government funds actually achieved the government's end of
educating the Native Americans. The failure to enforce
accountability displayed in this historical circumstance makes the
overeager embrace of accountability in the arts-funding cases seem
more benign, though no more constitutional. The government must
walk a tightrope when it funds works protected by the First
Amendment. Thus, government funding without accountability
strings attached, already a violation of the representative's
appointed role, is also potentially disastrous for church-church
peace and church-state relations.
114. See id. at 87-95.
115. See id. at 87, 92.
116. See id. at 107.
117. See id. at 153-54.
118. See id. at 92.
119. See id. at 135.
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IiM. DOCUMENTATION OF CONTEMPORARY WEALTH TRANSFER TO
RELIGION
The arts-funding cases illuminate church-state issues because
the Supreme Court has resisted a bright-line rule against
government aid to religion under the Establishment Clause and
instead adopted a case-by-case approach in which the essential
inquiry has been the contemporary balance of power between
church and stateUO While the Court has consistently used this
balance calculus, its level of distrust of religious entities and the
government has hit different plateaus."2 In some eras, the Court
has echoed Madison's more distrustful attitude. For example, in
1973, the Court declared that "notwithstanding the 'high social
importance' of the State's purposes, neither may justify an eroding
of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now firmly
emplanted." 22 Recently, however, the Court has taken a more
trusting attitude toward religion, stating that "certain entities that
exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and
that foster its 'moral or mental improvement,' should not be
inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of
loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes."123
During the Supreme Court's last term, a plurality married this
rosy view of religion to a notion that religion need not be treated
distinctively, and ruled that the provision of computers to private,
parochial schools through a federal program did not violate the
Establishment Clause:
[If the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular
purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to
religion, to all who adequately further that purpose then it is
fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has
the effect of furthering that secular purpose. The government,
in crafting such an aid program, has had to conclude that a
120. For a fuller discussion of this principle, see Hamilton, Vouchers, supra note 4, at 826
("[El stablishment doctrine has evolved into a context-dependent and era-dependent balancing
approach, which affords the Court maximum flexibility to identify inappropriate
relationships of power.").
121. See id. at 827-36.
122. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789 (1973).
123. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
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given level of aid is necessary to further that purpose among
secular recipients and has provided no more than that same
level to religious recipients. 124
On this reasoning, religion poses no threat to the state, but
rather should be treated as though it is on par with any other
entity. This is, in fact, the "equality" approach favored by Professors
Eisgruber and Sager." Both suffer from the fundamental defect
that religion is different, potentially more powerful, and more prone
to abuse power, a view reflected in the decision to include the
Establishment Clause, Madison's writings, and in the cultural
milieu at the time of the framing.
The Mitchell plurality even refused to embrace the concept that
federal funds easily diverted to sectarian use should be closely
scrutinized under the Establishment Clause, saying that "[tihe
issue is not divertibility of aid but rather whether the aid itself has
an impermissible content."'26 Accordingly, once the content of the
aid passes muster under the Establishment Clause, the plurality
would apparently immunize the law from further Establishment
Clause attack.
Two members of the Court, Justices O'Connor and Breyer, were
not as sanguine on this score, but they were unwilling to find actual
diversion of government resources to religious purposes in the
absence of direct proof (where the plaintiffs had had ten years to
uncover such diversion)."
Only three members of the Mitchell Court objected to the
plurality's and the concurrence's acquiescence in state support for
church schools through the federal computer program. A dissent by
Justice Souter repeatedly sounded Madison's themes of distrust
when money passes from state to church,'28 resisting the Court's
general inclination in this era to whitewash religion.
124. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2541 (2000) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist,
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas).
125. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHm. L. REV.
1245, 1282-84 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 448-50 (1994).
126. Id. at 2548.
127. See id. at 2556-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. See id. at 2572, 2574, 2595 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Like the trusting and optimistic view taken by Congress of the
National Endowment for the Arts at its inception,1 9 contemporary
aid to religious entities seems to have assumed that only good can
arise from funding religious entities.
A. Support for Sectarian Schools
The most innocuous-seeming support for religion can be found in
the school aid cases. These cases start with the Court's decision in
Everson v. Board of Education that public support for bus
transportation to all children, including those attending private,
sectarian schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause.3 ° The
Court reasoned that the aid did not cross the disestablishment
barrier because, "[the State contributes no money to the schools. It
does not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than
provide a general program to help parents get their children,
regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools." 1 While Justice Jackson vocally dissented that
even bussing for school children crossed the disestablishment
divide,132 the Court's finding that the program was "general," a
129. See H.R. REP. No. 89-618, at 7 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3186, 3192
(noting that the purpose of establishing a National Foundation on the Arts was, inter alia,
"to develop and promote... a broadly conceived national policy of support for the humanities
and the arts in the United States").
130. 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
131. Id. at 18.
132. See id. at 26-27. Justice Jackson wrote:
[T]he religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form
of propagation of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or
indirectlybe made public business and thereby be supported in whole or in part
at taxpayers' expense. That is a difference which the Constitution sets up
between religion and almost every other subject matter of legislation, a
difference which goes to the very root of religious freedom and which the Court
is overlooking today. This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights because it was
first in the forefathers' minds; it was set forth in absolute terms, and its
strength is its rigidity. It was intended not only to keep the states' hands out
of religion, but to keep religion's hands off the state, and above all, to keep
bitter religious controversy out of public life by denying to every denomination
any advantage from getting control of public policy or the public purse. Those
great ends I cannot but think are immeasurably compromised by today's
decision.
2001] 855
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:823
variant on the equality thesis proposed by Professors Eisgruber and
Sager, ended the inquiry.
In fact, Everson was the "three pence" decision that signaled the
beginning of a long series of disputes in the courts over the
constitutionality of school aid. Except for the 1950s, there has not
been a decade since Everson in which the Court has not addressed
a statute that provided school aid. In most cases, the aid has been
found constitutional. The mere presence of these cases shows that
religious schools and their families have not been shy about
lobbying for state support for their needs, legislatures have been
willing providers, and the Court has not been concerned about
Madison's slippery slope.
Buses were just the beginning. There has been a steady
elongation of the list of school supplies that the Supreme Court has
been willing to permit religious schools to receive from government
funds."' 3 Moreover, attempts to provide funding for sectarian
133. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2536-38 (2000) (upholding federal law
providing computers and other classroom aid to sectarian schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 208-09, 235 (1997) (overrulingAguilar v. Felton and upholding a New York City
program that allowed public school teachers to provide remedial education in parochial
schools); Zobrestv. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (allowingsign language
interpreter, under both federal and Arizona state statutes, for deaf student attending
Catholic high school); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482
(1986) (upholding grant under state vocational rehabilitation assistance program to blind
student pursuing a religious career at a Christian college); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,
404-06 (1985) (overturning a New York City program which used federal funds to pay public
school teachers to provide remedial teaching in parochial schools), overruled by Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-403 (1983) (upholding
a Minnesota tax deduction provided to parents for expenses incurred in sending children to
private schools, including parochial schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977)
(upholding provisions of an Ohio statute providing nonpublic school pupils with books,
standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services, and therapeutic and remedial services,
but overturning those provisions relating to instructional materials and equipment and field
trip services), overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2555 (2000); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 351-55, 373 (1975) (upholding a Pennsylvania statute allowing for
textbook loans to nonpublic schools, but overturning statutes providing for auxiliary services
and instructional materials), overruled in part by Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2555
(2000); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Libertyv. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,796-98 (1973)
(overturning New York statutes that provided aidto nonpublic schools, and provided aid and
tax benefits to parents of children attending nonpublic schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 666-67, 680 (1970) (finding constitutional a New York property tax exemption to
religious organizations using the property for religious worship); Flastv. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
103-04 (1968) (finding that taxpayers who brought suit challenging use of federal tax funds
to purchase materials for use in parochial schools had standing to do so because such an
856
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schools have taken the form of tax deductions,"3 4 tax credits," 5 and,
more recently, vouchers.1"' There has been general consensus that
religious schools cannot be directly funded by the government;
however, indirect funding through tax schemes or vouchers has
fallen in and out of fashion, and courts have been increasingly
willing to uphold programs closer to the line between the two.137
The plurality in Helms moved the closest to that line to date,
arguing that indirect funding is almost always constitutional. 8'
action, if proved, would violate the Establishment Clause); Board ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 238 (1968) (upholding a New York statute requiring school districts to lend, at no cost,
textbooks to students in public and private schools, including parochial schools); Everson v.
Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1,17-18 (1947) (holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit
New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares ofparochial school pupils as
a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and
other schools).
134. See, e.g., Mueller, 463 U.S. at 390-403 (upholding a Minnesota tax deduction for
expenses associated with sending children to school, including parochial schools).
135. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 666-67, 680 (upholdingNew York property tax exemption
for religious entities).
136. See, eg., Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 205-11 (Ohio 1999) (upholding a
Cleveland voucher program that provided tuition money for students to attend private
schools because any religious entanglement was an indirect result of the parents' decision
to send children to parochial school, but severing that portion of the program that gave
priority to those students whose parents belonged to a religious group that supported the
sectarian school); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 618 (Wis. 1998) (upholding the
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP), which provides indirect aid to parents of
children in private schools by sending tuition checks to the schools, made payable to the
parents ofthe child, who would then"restrictively endorse the checks to the private schools").
The program in Jackson was upheld in part because "not one cent flows from the State to a
sectarian private school under the amended MPCP except as a result of the necessary and
intervening choices of individual parents." Id. at 618. The Cleveland voucher program,
however, was recently struck down by the Sixth Circuit. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,
Nos. 00-3055/3060/3063,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 31367, at *47 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000).
137. Compare Pfeffer, supra note 33, at 314 (stating that most state constitutions
prohibited funding of sectarian schools), with Greg Todd, Comment, "Fully Participating"
Voucher Programs and the Wisconsin Template: A Brick or a Breach in the Wall of Church-
State Separation?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 710, 738 (2000) (concluding that"[a] voucher system
that indirectly funnels aid to public, sectarian, and private secular schools via parents'
individual private choices, and which applies to all children, regardless of which schools they
attend, is likely to survive scrutiny under any of [the Lemon,.establishment, or coercion]
tests").
138. The plurality specifically denounced a direct/indirect bright line rule, discussing
instead the recent trend toward favoring private choice: "If aid to schools, even 'direct aid,'
is neutrally available and, before reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes
through the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to
direct the aidelsewhere, the government has notprovided any'support of religion.' Mitchell,
120 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 489).
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B. Tax-Exempt Status for Religious Institutions
There is a patchwork of religious exemptions from taxes, from
property taxes to income taxes. Tax exemption for religious
organizations is, on its face, a benefit for religion, because an
"exemption" relieves a religious entity from having to pay taxes that
it otherwise would have to pay." 9 A version of property tax
exemption has been in place for so long that it has come to be
treated as a neutral baseline that could not violate the
Constitution's rule against establishment.140 From Madison's
perspective, though, tax exemption looks less innocent."' John
Witte captured the spirit of Madison's concerns when he stated:
Opponents [of tax exemptions of church property] insist that
such exemptions are subsidies of religion that are proscribed by
the establishment clause and its principle of state separation
from the church.... Opponents look to the future and portend
with alarm the further erosion of the state tax base and the
further aggrandizement of church wealth and power ....
Mainline religious groups have no inherent aversion to payment
of taxes. The Bible enjoins Christians to "[riender, .. to Caesar
the things that are Caesar's" and to pay "taxes to whom taxes
are due, revenue to whom revenue is due"... Arguments for the
free exercise right to exemption from taxes, therefore, appear
ill-founded.142
That was almost ten years ago, and there is little indication that
religious entities have any impetus to reverse tax exemption. To the
contrary, the trend is toward expanding existing exemptions and
simultaneously finding other financial benefits from government.
139. Black's Law Dictionary defines an exemption, in the taxation context, as "an amount
allowed as a deduction from adjusted gross income in arriving at taxable income." BLACICS
LAW DICTIONARY 572 (6th ed. 1990).
140. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 676-80.
141. See Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, at 66 ("As the Bill violates
equalityby subjecting some to peculiar burdens; so it violates the same principle, by granting
to others peculiar exemptions.").
142. John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid




Many have struggled to find the right baseline for tax treatment
ofreligious entities. There are those who argue that tax exemption
is not really a benefit for religion, because it is folly to assume that
tax exemption is a privilege. Rather, all taxes should be considered
burdens. In essence, they argue that the baseline ought to be a
presumption of zero taxation. Others have offered different
baselines for determining whether tax-exempt status for religion is
an unconstitutional benefit. Most recently, Erika King argued that
tax benefits should be available for religious entities when the
religious entity is similarly situated to other entities receiving the
same tax treatment.14 John Swomley would set the baseline at a
not-for-profit category, so that religious entities receive the same
tax treatment as others that are not-for-profit.'" John Witte would
dissolve the special religious exemptions and provide religious
entities the tax benefits of charitable institutions if the religious
entities fall under the definition of a charitable organization."' Ed
Zelinsky has criticized such categorical approaches to tax benefits,
saying that sometimes they are akin to tax deductions and
sometimes more akin to direct benefits."' The main point of this
Article is not to find the doctrinally correct treatment, but rather to
explore the expanding contours of tax-exempt treatment and the
consequent expansion of financial benefit to religion.
1. State and Local Tax Exemption
a. Property Tax Exemption
The tax exemption of church property began as a narrow category
of exemption covering only those aspects of the physical plant and
grounds devoted to worship.'47 That limitation has steadily been
143. See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRAcUSEL.REV.
971, 1036-37 (1999) (arguing that similarly situated treatment comports with the
Establishment Clause and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
144. See John M. Swomley, The Impact of Tax Exemption and Deductibility on Churches
and Public Policy, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 595, 597 (1992).
145. See Witte, supra note 142, at 408.
146. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct
Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. Rv. 379, 400-09 (1998).
147. See, e.g., Witte, supra note 142, at 372 (noting that the only church property exempt
at common law included "t]he properties of incorporated established churches that were
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dissolved as local authorities have permitted more and more land
uses to justify tax-exempt status, including hospitals, schools, and
daycare centers.148
In the main, this form of wealth transfer has been more liberally
applied to religious bodies as the years have passed. By the time the
Supreme Court was asked to address whether property tax
exemptions for religious institutions were consistent with the
Establishment Clause, they were such an embedded structure that
the Court shied away from holding it unconstitutional. 49 The first
part of the Court's opinion in Walz would have led one to assume
that property tax exemption was inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause. "The general principle deducible from the
First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this:
that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion
or governmental interference with religion."15
The Court made a sharp turn, however, saying that tax-exempt
status had been in existence for so many years that it must be
constitutional. "Nothing in this national attitude toward religious
tolerance and two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation
has given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or
religion and on the contrary it has operated affirmatively to help
guarantee the free exercise of all forms of religious belief."'
devoted to the appropriate 'religious uses' prescribed by ecclesiastical law, such as chapels,
parsonages, glebes, and consecrated cemeteries").
148. See, e.g., Phillips v. Mission Fellowship Bible Church, 955 S.W.2d 917,918-19 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1997) (upholding tax exemption under a broad state statute for 1.05 acre tract upon
which is situated the church building, a 6,800 square foot structure that contains a
sanctuary, chapel, Sunday School classrooms, religious lending library, fellowship areas,
administrative offices, guest quarters for visiting pastors and missionaries, landscaped
grounds, approach roads, and a parking area); Hapletahv. Assessor of Fallsburg, 590 N.E.2d
1182,1183-86 (N.Y. 1992) (upholding property tax exemption for a school and 31 acre parcel
of land, a facility that contains a kitchen, communal dining room for all participants, a ritual
bath, recreational facilities, classrooms, synagogues, a multi-unit dormitory building, 64
bungalows, 6 trailers, and 10 acres ofwooded hiking land, used primarily duringthe summer
months for rigorous "religious and educational instruction").
149. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676-80 (1970). Tax exemption for religious
leaders and organizations has been around a long time. See, e.g., Erika King, supra note 143,
at 973-81; John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 22 CimB. L. REV. 521, 522-45 (1992).
150. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
151. Id. at 678.
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The entrenchment of property tax exemption has created a
powerful financial incentive for religious institutions to expand
their range of activities. Churches have entered into lease
arrangements with for-profit entities, and are now offering
everything from fitness centers, child and senior care centers,
motion picture theaters, and even automobile repair on campuses
dubbed "mega churches."152 They compete with secular offerings
and do so below their secular competitors' costs with tax-exempt
status. The churches bristle, of course, at the suggestion that any
of these uses are not an "exercise" of religion and therefore fully
expect the tax exemption originally intended for houses of worship
to apply to these new uses. Obviously, the contours of tax exemption
for religious properties are highly contested. The current political
and legislative milieu, though, has favored expansion of the
privilege.
The other emerging arena in which churches and church schools
are receiving tax-free status appears in the increasing willingness
of local municipalities to underwrite tax-free municipal bonds for
church buildings and universities.15
152. See, e.g., Sybel Alger, Church to Celebrate Purchase of New Site at Service: Victoria
Community Church inRiverside Plans to Build on a 48-acre Parcel onAlessandro Boulevard,
PREsS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, California), May 27, 2000, at B06, available in 2000 WL
19871439 (discussing a planned mega-church, which, if approved by the city, would include
"a gymnasium, an outdoor theater, a food court, a bookstore and senior-citizen housing");
Lori Baker, Booming Church ServesAllAges; Community of Joy Has 11,000 Members, ARiZ.
REPUBLIC, Dec. 29,1999, at 1, available in WL ARPG-C Database (describing a mega~church
with "a child-care center serving 430 babies through preschoolers; an elementary school with
270 students from kindergarten through eighth grade, a leadership training center and
administrative offices"); Bill Banks,AddedBlessings Getting Bigger: With Congregations in
the Thousands, 'Mega Churches' Keep Growing as They Embrace Diversity, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Feb. 17, 2000, at J1, available in WL ATLANTA-JC-C Database (describing such
mega-church characteristics as "multiple ministries, a large sports complex, a television
and/or radio ministry, a large day-care center and an elaborate educational program"); John
Keilman, Suburban Churches Enjoy Boom, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 26, 2000, at A,
available in 2000 WL 7586600 (describing a planned mega-church that includes "two full-
sized basketball courts and three baseball diamonds," a sanctuary with "a professional-
qualitytheaterstage andperhaps awall ofvideo screens," and"a coffee shop and bookstore");
Lisa Miller, Registers Ring in Sanctuary Stores: Tax-Exempt Church Shops Peddle Stuffed
Bears, Tapes and Special Coffee Blends, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1999, at B1 (describing San
Franciso's Grace Cathedral, which features a cafM that "lets customers browse the
bookshelves and listen to music while they sip specialty coffee blends").
153. See, e.g., Kirk Loggins,Lipscomb toAppealRuling;20Private State InstitutionsHave
Received Similar Tax-Free Bonds, TENNESsEAN, Oct. 26,2000, at 13, available in 2000 WL
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b. Sales and Use Taxes
The incremental expansion of property tax exemption has
increased challenges by churches to other general schemes of
taxation. In 1990, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether
the Free Exercise Clause required the California sales tax to
exempt religious entities in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization.' In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a
California sales and use tax as applied to a religious ministry's sale
of recorded broadcasts and other materials. 55 Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries argued that a "tax on religious materials violated the
First Amendment," specifically the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. 5 ' The Court did not find that the Constitution
required this wealth transfer, but rather ruled that religious
organizations could be taxed. It reasoned that the sales and use tax
was not a tax on the right to disseminate religious information,
ideas, or beliefs per se, but instead was a tax on the privilege of
making retail sales of tangible personal property and on the
storage, use, or other consumption of tangible personal property in
California. 5
7
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries illustrates that the Court has not
abandoned its balancing approach in the wealth transfer issues;
there are financial advantages that churches may not demand of
the government. It also illustrates how far religious entities in this
era are willing to go to argue for those financial advantages.
2. Federal Income Tax Exemption
Local property tax exemptions come with few strings attached,
except for some minor reporting requirements and the less obvious
perils of engendering public disapprobation. This is a very different
situation from the federal income tax exemption, which comes with
25361092 (noting that thirteen private colleges and universities in Tennessee with
institutional ties to religious denominations had benefitted from tax-exempt bonds issued by
local municipalities).
154. 493 U.S. 378, 380 (1990).
155. See id.
156. Id. at 383-84.
157. See id. at 394-96. The same conclusion has been reached regarding social security
taxes. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982).
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burdens on the freedom of speech and association that in turn
endanger the quality of the information in the marketplace of
expression regarding the political preferences of some of society's
most powerful players, the churches.
Religious entities have obtained tax exemption from federal
income tax laws only on the condition that they foreswear lobbying
on particular issues and supporting particular political
candidates."5 In other words, the price of federal income tax-
exempt status has been greater (though certainly not total) silence
in the political ring.1 59 The instinct to place limitations on religion's
power in exchange for federal government income tax exemption is
perfectly consistent with the Constitution's general drive to a
balance of power between church and state.160 This particular
balance, though, would appear to be a devil's bargain.
The result of the federal income tax exemption is to muzzle
churches, and they have strained at the limitations. 161 While
candidate-neutral "voter guides" have become common in many
churches,'62 some churches do endorse particular candidates
158. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994) (granting exemption from taxation to religious
organizations, "no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation... and which does not participate in, or
intervene in... any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office"); see also Christian Echoes Natl Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
856-57 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that the denial of religious organization's tax-exempt status
for political advocacy does not violate the First Amendment); Branch Ministries, Inc. v.
Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 1999) (revoking church's tax-exempt status after
publication of an anti-Clinton advertisement); Richard C. Montgomery, Charitable
Organizations and Prohibited Political Activities, 63 PA. B. Ass'N Q. 83 (1992) (discussing
section 501(c)(3)).
159. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2000) ("Activities which constitute participation or
intervention in a political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate include, but
are not limited to, the publication or distribution of written or printed statements or the
making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate."); see also 26
U.S.C. § 501(h) (denying tax exemption to organizations whose activities include "carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation" if the organization makes
either lobbying or grass roots expenditures in excess of the ceiling amount for either
expenditure each year). Religious organizations do not qualify for the latter exemption. See
Id. § 501(hX5).
160. See Hamilton, Vouchers, supra note 4, at 812.
161. See, e.g., Rossotti, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 26-27 (revoking church's tax-exempt status after
its publication of anti-Clinton advertisement).
162. See, e.g., Curt Anderson, LRSRuling Shakes Up Christian Coalition, Aiz. REPUBLiC,
June 11, 1999, at A18, available in 1999 WL 4178302.
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contrary to the IRS Code. Most voter guides do not endorse any
particular candidate, but make clear where each candidate stands
on matters of extreme importance to the particular church.
It is a nonsensical and dangerous scheme. Church and state do
not cease their dialectical relationship in the face of the federal
income tax laws. Instead, the relationship between certain churches
and certain candidates is driven underground. It creates an "old
boys" relationship between political and religious leaders, thereby
reducing the knowledge of the general public of the actual play of
power. It invites cabal and close, unexamined relationships and
results in a situation that is the very opposite of the constitutional
drive to make government transparent and accountable to the
greatest extent possible.
163
The depletion of the marketplace of ideas by the federal tax policy
is intolerable. Churches are the most powerful human structure to
challenge the assumptive power of the state, and should not be
barred from speaking out frankly at these crucial moments in
American politics, not only for the sake of their members, but
equally for the sake of nonmembers, who have a right to know who
is handling the levers of power. The federal income tax policy
reduces the capacity of the churches to speak out on the qualities of
leadership their faiths would endorse, which is a net loss in the
debate over virtue and its characteristics and undercuts the ability
of the churches to challenge and criticize certain candidates. This
is a troubling attack on the churches' rights under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.16'
But the balance between church and state must be maintained.
Federal income tax exemption with no countervailing policy that
makes up for this religious privilege goes to the heart of Madison's
deep concerns about the silent accumulation of wealth and power
by religious entities.6 ' Without the limitations on political activity,
the exemptions would induce many organizations to claim some
religious affiliation to benefit from the tax-exempt privilege, and
163. See, e.g., Hamilton, Pathways, supra note 14, at 11-12 (discussing the need for
transparency).
164. But see Christian Echoes Nat'lMinistryv. United States, 470 F.2d 849,856 (10th Cir.
1972) (holding that the denial of religious organization's tax-exempt status for political
advocacy does not violate the First Amendment).
165. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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religiously related organizations would have relatively more wealth
than secular organizations (other than charitable organizations) to
spend on political objectives.'66 There is no lengthy history of federal
income tax exemption in the United States, a la Walz, and therefore
there is no tradition that would be undermined by repealing the
churches' income tax exemption status. Indeed, the Sixteenth
Amendment, which allowed for federal income taxation, does not
exclude religious entities. 1
The federal income tax exemption laws have been used to permit
the federal government to require certain beliefs and practices to
obtain the tax-exempt benefit, which is another reason to eliminate
this particular type of wealth transfer to religion. In Bob Jones
University v. United States, the Court declined to recognize the
University's federal tax-exempt status due to the school's racially
discriminatory admissions policy. 68 Just as funding in the arts
context has provided a platform for politicians and representatives
to censor and to punish unpopular or unconventional views
expressed in artworks, wealth transfer to religious institutions
opens the door to government constraint of unpopular religious
views. Rather, the important point to be made is that government
financial support, and especially federal government support,
inevitably entails the imposition of mainstream views on dissenting
institutions. It reduces the diversity and the mix of views available
in the marketplace of religion. On its face, the Bob Jones University
opinion may have appeared to condemn the beliefs of Bob Jones
University, but, as a constitutional matter, the fault did not lie in
the University's beliefs but rather in its decision to accept federal
tax exemption in the first place. Any entity acccepting government
support needs to understand the inevitable risks of which Madison-
warned.' 69
166. See, e.g., Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful
Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 320 (1990) ("It is nearly as settled, at least in
Congress and the courts, that permitting a section 501(c)(3) organization to engage in
election-related activity would be equivalent to granting a 'subsidy' of public funds for the
activity.").
167. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
168. 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983).
169. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 185, at 6 ("Religion, which should be in love with
witness and persuasion, has all too often in history allowed itself to be seduced by the love
oftemporal power, a passionate but dysfunctional and even immoral love affair that has led
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There are those who would applaud the instinct at the heart of
government funding that tends to generate a uniform society.
Stephen Macedo has defended the concept of "civil society" on
the very ground that it reduces differences and increases
homogenization.170 Such uniformity of belief, however, is the
opposite of Madison's vision of the healthy constitutional scheme.
C. Direct Handouts
1. Medicare and Faith-healers
Federal Medicare law permits those who believe that medical
care is inappropriate to obtain federal dollars for the "nursing" of
their dying members.171 In its first form, the Act specifically
identified Christian Science "sanatoria" as the recipients of such
federal funding. After that obviously unconstitutional statute was
overturned,7 2 the Act was amended so that it did not explicitly aid
Christian Scientists by substituting "Religious Nonmedical Health
Care Institution" whenever "Christian Science Sanatoria" had
appeared.'73 The amendment was an instance of pretextual
neutrality, where the actual purpose of the Act to funnel funds to
a particular religious sect is obvious, but the language employed to
do so is neutral on its surface.17 4 On a similar tack, an HMO bill
to much human misery and has been destructive as well of true faith."); see generally
MONSMA, supra note 10; Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1.
170. See generally Macedo, supra note 62, at 420-23.
171. See Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Children's
Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck, 938 F. Supp. 1466, 1479-80 (D. Minn. 1996)
(holding unconstitutional a regulation mandating payments for Christian Science members
because it was sect specific).
172. See Children's Healthcare, 938 F. Supp. at 1485.
173. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4454, 111 Stat. 251, 426-32
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 2-4, Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir.
2000) (No. 98-3521), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3410 (Nov. 27, 2000) (No. 00-914).
174. Addressing a similar theory in a Free Exercise case, the Supreme Court found that
the apparently neutral language in an ordinance banning "animal sacrifice" was in fact
pretextual and hid the legislature's agenda to persecute the members of the Santeria
religion. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (finding schoors facially




in the 105th Congress contained a provision that would have
permitted faith-healing nurses to receive HM4O insurance funds,
and to do so without satisfying the rigorous screening requirements
attached to any medical provider's request for payment. 175
2. The Directed Sale of the Old Soldiers Home Land to Catholic
University
In a little-noticed amendment to a Department of Defense
authorization bill, Congress directed the Old Soldiers Home in
Washington to sell forty-nine acres to its neighbor, Catholic
University.76 The Home, which was in severe financial straits, had
asked for permission from Congress to sell the forty-nine acres to
avoid bankruptcy. Instead of permitting the Home to put the land
on the open market to achieve its highest value, Congress directed
the Home to sell the land to Catholic University for the construction
of a Peace Institute. 77 The Home, which had worked out a plan
with a contractor to turn the land into a profit generator, resisted
the sale, as did a group of retired veterans who were either housed
at the Home, or hoped to have the Home available if needed.178
In the face of such pressure, and the threat of a lawsuit based on
the Establishment Clause, Congress amended the law to permit an
open market sale, but gave Catholic University the right of first
refusal and placed a one-year time limit on the open market sale.179
3. Church Breach of Fiduciary Duty
One of the means by which churches can have their finances
reduced is through clergy malpractice lawsuits.18 In these cases,
175. See S. 2416, 105th Cong. § 3(d) (1998).
176. See H.R. 3616, 105th Cong. § 1043 (1998).
177. See Dale Eisman, Vets, Church Struggle Over 49-Acre Parcel in Washington,
VIRINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 22, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 7159310.
178. See Steve Vogel, Veterans Home RetainsRight to Keep Operating: Defense BillAllows
Land in NE to be Sold to the Highest Bidder, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1999, at B4.
179. See H.R. 1401, 106th Cong. § 365 (1999).
180. See, e.g., Paul A. Clark, Clergy Malpractice After F.G. v. MacDonell and Sanders v.
Casa View Baptist Church, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 229 (1998); Melissa A. Provost, First
Amendment-Free Exercise Clause-Cleric Who Engaged in Sexual Acts While Providing
Pastoral Counseling to a Parishioner Can Be Held Liable for Breach of Fiduciary Duty-F.G.
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churches are charged with responsibility for knowingly permitting
clergy members to abuse children or disabled adults.'' Churches
v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 696 A.2d 697 (1997), 8 SETON HAL. CONST. L.J. 625 (1998);
James A. Serritella, Insurance Coverage Issues in Cases of Clergy Misconduct, 39 CATH. LAW.
55 (1999); Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited Liability for Sexual Misconduct
in the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 1 (1996); Faye M. Hammersley,
Comment, Reconciling L.L.N. v. Clauderand Pritzlaffv. Archdiocese ofMilwaukee: Does this
Mean Blanket Immunity for Religious Organizations?, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 611 (1998); James
Brooke, Facing Ruin From Lawsuits, Anglicans in Canada Slash Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 2000, at A6.
181. See, e.g., Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 430
(2d Cir. 1999) (vacating and remanding for new trial on questions arising from fraudulent
concealment tolling statute, but affirming jury finding that the diocese breached fiduciary
duty to parishioner by failing to investigate whether a priest had sexually abused minor
parishioners); Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 335-40 (5th Cir. 1998)
(finding that plaintiffs could sue minister directly, but that church was not liable for
minister's sexual harassment of female employees during the course of providing marriage
counseling that violated church policy); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1427-29 (7th Cir.
1994) (finding that Illinois law would not recognize parishioners claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against pastor and church for pastor's involvement with the parishioner, to whom he
was providing counseling, but allowing claim under Illinois psychotherapy statute along with
claim of professional negligence); Fenelon v. Byrd, No. Civ. A. 99-1052, 1999 WL 600380, at
*1 n.5 (E.D. La. Aug. 6, 1999) (dismissing, among others, plaintiff's claim for clergy
malpractice because no such claim exists under Lousiana law); Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d
1027, 1079-81 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (allowing claim for respondeat superior liability for priest's
alleged behavior toward parishioner, but dismissing breach of fiduciary duty claims against
priest and diocese); Wilson v. Diocese of the Episcopal Church, No. 96 Civ. 2400 (JGK), 1998
WL 82921 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,1998) (dismissing claims ofnegligent hiring and liability under
respondeat superior against church and diocese when they did not and could not have known
of propensity of priest to commit sexual assault when they hired him); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Havey, 887 F. Supp. 195 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (finding that insurance company had no duty to
defend charges of sexual abuse of minors, because behavior was not covered by policy, and
further, because Illinois does notrecognize a duty between clergymen and congregations, and
finding that company had no duty to indemnify priest for any award arising therefrom,
because policy was not applicable); Iselyv. Capuchin Province, 880 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Mich.
1995) (dismissing breach of contract, statutory negligence, and common law negligence
claims against a seminary and its directors for failing to report priest's sexual abuse when
there was no evidence that directors were on notice ofthe abuse); Barquin v. Roman Catholic
Diocese, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 275 (D. Vt. 1993) (holding that claims against Catholic orphanage
were not barred by statute of limitations when plaintiff recalled sexual abuse during
psychotherapy 40 years later); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding
no claim of clergy malpractice sustainable in New York, and holding intentional tort claims
for sexual abuse time barred); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo.
1996) (reinstating trial court's breach of fiduciary duty verdict against minister who
inappropriately touched child parishioner during therapy sessions, and finding that Free
Exercise Clause of First Amendment protected neither minister nor church from liability);
Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220, 1231 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding verdict of breach of
fiduciary duty and outrageous conduct against minister who had engaged in a sexual
relationship with minor parishioner, along with verdict of negligent hiring and supervision
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carry insurance for such breaches, but that has not halted them
from lobbying for immunity from such lawsuits, thereby leaving the
victim with a low-paid clergy member as the only means of
redressing the abuse in a civil suit.
Colorado, viewed as a testing ground for such laws, has
considered legislation that would make church coffers immune to
fiduciary duty claims even when the church knew of the abuse."8 2
The law was narrowly defeated, and has been reintroduced."iR The
Presbyterian and Catholic Churches joined together to lobby for the
bill, and the special counsel on religious and civil liberties for the
National Council of Churches stated: "Churches provide so many
social services .... Compensatory awards you can understand, but
when you get into punitive awards of millions of dollars ... you
have to wonder if this is what society wants."84
D. Mission Support, or Charitable Choice
Of the new entrants in the wealth movement to religion, mission
support, or as it is euphemistically called today, "charitable choice"
proposals, ought to give both churches and the government reason
to pause." In all fairness, some churches have publicly condemned
against conference, but reversing claims for breach of fiduciary duty and punitive damages
against conference, and reversing compensatory and punitive damages aagainst minister and
conference); F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997) (allowing parishioner to proceed
with breach of fiduciary duty claim against married rector, and counselor, with whom she
was involved in a sexual relationship).
182. See, e.g., Editorial, Clergy, Therapists and Sex the Issue: Should it be More Difficult
to Get Money When an Affair Goes Bad?; Our View: More Difficult, Yes; Impossible, No, DEN.
ROCKY MTN. NEws, Feb. 8, 1999, at 34A, available in 1999 WL 6639259 (discussing then-
proposed House Bill 1290, which would insulate religious entities through limitations on
lawsuits "based on breach of fiduciary duty to cases involving money or property only...
[tihat definition still covers a lot of territory... [but not a suit claiming a member of the
clergy sexually exploited someone he (or perhaps she) was counseling").
183. See Jillian Lloyd, Churches Seeking Shield from Lawsuits, CHRISTIANSCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 28, 1999, at 1.
184. Id. (quoting Rev. Oliver Thomas).
185. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, GoD's NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF
RELIGION IN POLITICS 5 (2000) ("A religion that becomes too settled in the political sphere,
happily amassing influence and using it, is likely to lose its best and most spiritual self, as
has happened to established churches all over Europe, which nowadays find themselves
virtuallywithout a voice-small wonder, as they have relied on man rather than God for their
sustenance."); see generally MONSMA, supra note 10, at 4-7.
2001] 869
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:823
these proposals,'86 but these proposals are receiving negligible
resistance in Congress and are portrayed as an unalloyed good for
the United States. Already, federal statutes have been amended to
include charitable choice provisions."8 7 Both political parties made
charitable choice a pillar of their presidential campaigns.'
Charitable choice is nothing other than government aid for
religious missions. To state the same point differently, religious
entities that seek and receive charitable choice money are those
that engage in such services for the purpose of fulfilling their
religious mission. These funds typically are directed at the good
works-from care for the poor to education to drug treatment-that
are at the heart of the particular religion's mission, and it is the
religious component that is credited with the success of the
program. Madison's ride down the slippery slope that starts at
"three pence" surely stops here, with government funding core,
mission activities of religious organizations.
The reasoning behind charitable choice is that faith-based
organizations (or FBOs, as they have been dubbed) have a better
track record than the government in solving problems such as
teenage delinquency and drug dependency,'89 or that they provide
186. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
187. See proposed provisions cited supra note 68.
188. For an extensive listing of Governor George W. Bush's proposed "faith based
initiatives," see Faith Based Initiatives, at http://www.georgewbush.com/issues.asp?
FormMode=FullText&ID=33 (last visited Sept. 19, 2000). In a May 24, 1999 speech
addressing the"Role of Faith-Based Organizations,"Vice President Al Gore stated: "I believe
we should extend this carefully tailored approach [charitable choice] to other vital services
where faith-based organizations can play a role-such as drugtreatment, homelessness, and
youth violence prevention." Al Gore, The Role of Faith-Based Organizations, at
http:J/www.algore.com/speechesfaith_052499.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2000).
189. See Teen Challenge World Wide Network, at http//www.teenchallenge.com/main/
tc/abouttci.htm (last visited Sept. 19,2000) ("During their 1-year stay, [residents] do not hold
down outside jobs, as all of their attention is focused on the program. We challenge the
residents to embrace the Christian faith. We see that when they do, their lives are
transformed and they find true meaning and purpose."); see also Teen Challenge's Proven
Answer to the Drug Problem, at http:/www.teenchalenge.com/tcreview.html (last visited
Sept. 19, 2000) (reviewing a study of Teen Challenge International's residential program,
conducted by Northwestern University researcher Dr. Aaron Bicknese). The organization's
review of the study, completed in June 1999, asserts that:
[tihe results show that with at least one very popular type of publicly funded
secular drug treatment program, Teen Challenge is in many ways far more
effective. The study particularly emphasized Teen Challenge's ability to help
students gain new social skills, so that upon leaving the program, the Teen
870
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superior counseling support in prisons.19 ° Yet, such groups, like
Teen Challenge or Prison Fellowship, claim that the reason their
programs work better is because of their religious content.191 We
need to be absolutely clear here: the but-for reason proffered for the
success of these religious welfare service programs is the presence
of God, or religion, in the program. They claim they work better
because God is integrally incorporated throughout the program.' 92
The opposite point is being made by these groups as well: without
God, a program cannot work and therefore the government cannot
succeed with such programs. Thus, government funding is being
employed, not because a religious organization is filling a gap left
by the government's decision to reduce its involvement in welfare
services, but rather because the religious organization will offer a
different set of welfare services-religious welfare services.
Until recently, religious entities receiving government money for
social programs had been required to show that the money was
used for nonsectarian purposes.9" This requirement arose out of
Challenge student, compared to clients of the secular programs surveyed, is
productively employed at a much higher rate and has a dramatically lower
chance of returning for further residential treatment.
Teen Challenge's Proven Answer to the Drug Problem, supra.
190. See Prison Fellowship Ministries at http://www.pfm.org (last visited Sept. 19,2000).
191. See supra notes 189-90; see also Kevin Butler, Faith-Based Groups Win Aid, Praise
in Battle Against Serious Social Ills, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAn.Y, A28 (Aug. 14, 2000), available
in LEXIS, News Library, Investor's Business Daily File (citing support for the "faith factor"
of charitable choice); Al Gore, The Role of Faith-Based Organizations, at
http'/www.algore.com/speechestspeeches-faith_052499.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2000).
Gore argues:
There is a reason faith-based approaches have shown special promise with
challenges such as drug addiction, youth violence, and homelessness.
Overcomingthese problems takes something more than money or assistance-it
requires an inner discipline and courage, deep within the individual. I believe
that faith in itself is sometimes essential to spark a personal
transformation-and to keep that person from falling back into addiction,
delinquency, or dependency.
Gore, supra.
192. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (discussing the religious bases ofboth
Teen Challenge and Prison Fellowship).
193. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-73 (1975) (upholding a Pennsylvania
statute allowing for textbook loans to nonpublic schools, but overturning as violative of the
Establishment Clause statutes providing for auxiliary services and instructionalmaterials);
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973)
(overturning NewYork statutes that provided aid to nonpublic schools, and provided aid and
tax benefits to parents of children attending nonpublic schools because the statutes had a
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the case law forbidding government aid to pervasively sectarian
institutions, a principle that rests on the fundamental consti-
tutional norm that all expenditures of government funds ought to
be capable of being accounted to the people on neutral grounds. 94
"primary effect that advance[d] religion" and were violative of the Establishment Clause);
Columbia Union College v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151,157-58 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that direct
state funding of general education courses at a "pervasively sectarian" institution would
violate the Establishment Clause); Deckerv. OTDonnell, 661 F.2d 598,606-08 (7th Cir. 1980)
(holding that placement of persons employed under the Comprehensive Employment
Training Act (CETA) in sectarian schools created an impermissible risk of political
entanglement for the CETA program); Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684, 700-01
(D.D.C. 1994) (holding that National Telecommunications and Information Administration
regulations prohibiting sectarian use of federally funded broadcast equipment did not
excessively entangle government with religion).
194. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,389-90
(1990); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 684-85 (1989) (finding that payments,
whether called "fixed donation[s]," "price," or "fixed contributions," made to churches for
services called "auditing and training" are not deductible charitable contributions or gifts);
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (opinion of Brennan,
J.) (finding that a Texas statute providing sales tax exemption for long-term subscriptions
on religious periodicals but not nonreligious periodicals violated Establishment Clause);
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1987) (holding that
Arkansas sales tax scheme that taxed general interest magazines but exempted newspapers
and religious, professional, trade, and sports journals, and/or publications printed and
published within the state, violated First Amendment on freedom of the press grounds); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983) (holding that the University's
policy of refusing admission to interracial couples was racially discriminatory; nonprofit
educational institutions with discriminatory admissions policies, even if based on religious
interpretation, were not eligible for tax exemption; contributions to such schools were not
eligible for charitable deductions); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 396,
415-19 (1982) (vacating on jurisdictional grounds a decision enjoining enforcement of a
cooperative federal-state excise tax scheme to provide benefits to unemployedworkers, which
entitled employers to reimbursement of up to 90% of the taxes paid if the employer was in
a defined category of "covered" institutions, including, inter alia, religious organizations);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-55 (1982) (invalidating a Minnesota statute imposing
registration and reporting requirements on religious organizations receiving more than half
of their total contributions from nonmembers or nonaffiliated organizations, but none on
those receiving the same from members/affiliating organizations); Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982)
(dismissing for lack of standing as either taxpayers or citizens, a challenge to a transfer
without payment of federally ordered property to a religiously related college); Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 735-36, 748-50 (1974) (denying injunctive relief that would
protect tax-exempt/charitable contribution deduction status to a university that maintained
racially discriminatory admissions practice, in spite of claim that practice was allegedly
driven by religious interpretation); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 735-36, 741-49 (1973)
(upholding a proposed South Carolina bond scheme designed to generate revenue through
issuance of tax-exempt bonds that would benefit a Baptist college, because the scheme did
not constitute excessive entanglement, nor was the school pervasively sectarian); Nyquist,
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As a result, religiously affiliated organizations have evolved, with
a separate existence from their sectarian parent and with their
claims to secular handling of government money intact.195 As others
before me have argued, a system that generates an internal split
between mission and proselytizing in a religious organization is a
system that is unhealthy for religious entities.'96 If there is a claim
to secularization in our society, a claim I usually resist as an
empirical matter, it has occurred when religious organizations have
accepted government money for their mission and split apart in
order to receive it. 197 There is little question that such funding
results in the very end that Madison predicted and feared: "[A] Bill
establishing a provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion'...
413 U.S. at 771-72, 798 (invalidating on Establishment Clause grounds a New York statute
granting aid to nonpublic schools); United States v. Christian Echoes Natl Ministry, Inc., 404
U.S. 561, 562-66 (1972) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction the U.S.
government's appeal of an order granting a tax refund to a corporate plaintiff which the
district court judge had singularly found was operated exclusively for religious purposes and
was thus exempt under the Internal Revenue Code despite its lobbying activities; because
the judge found only that the organization qualified for tax exemption, and did not find a
congressional act unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied, the government
improperly relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1252 as the basis for appellate jurisdiction); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 675-76, 678-79 (1971) (striking as violative of the Establishment
Clause the portion of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 placing a 20-year limit on
the use of government financed facilities for religious purposes, but upholding the remainder
of the Act); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-80 (1970) (upholding New York statute
exempting from tax property owned by organization with, and used for, exclusively religious
purposes as violative of neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,209-12 (1948) (granting mandamus
requiring board of education to adopt and enforce rules prohibiting teaching of religious
education in public schools and in public buildings when occupied by the schools); Everson
v. Board ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1,15-18 (1947) (upholdingresolution providingfor transportation
of students to both public and parochial schools).
195. See, e.g., Catholic Charities USA, Who We Are, at http-J/www.catholiccharitiesusa.
orglwho/ (last visited Sept. 19,2000) ("[Our] mission is: to provide service for people in need,
to advocate for justice in social structures, and to call the entire Church and other people of
good will to do the same.").
196. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 185, at 6 ("Religion, which should be in love with
witness and persuasion, has all too often in history allowed itself to be seduced by the love
of temporal power, a passionate but dysfunctional and even immoral love affair that has led
to much human misery and has been destructive as well of true faith."); see generally
MONSMA, supra note 10, at 80-107; Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, at
67-68.
197. See generally MONSMA, supra note 10, at 120-27 (describing the "pervasively
sectarian7 standard and arguing that if it were strictly followed, religious organizations
would not be eligible to receive funds until purged of religious elements).
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if finally armed with the sanctions of a law, will be a dangerous
abuse of power .... ""8
Even these disestablishment principles-the requirement that a
religious organization create a secular recipient of government
funds-appear to have fallen by the wayside, however, as recent
charitable choice proposals have proliferated that would give
government money to pervasively sectarian institutions without
any meaningful limitation.'99 Indeed, such proposals encourage
religious organizations to retain their full religious character in the
context of providing social services. First, they provide explicit
permission to fund pervasively sectarian entities.2" Second, there
is implicit permission for indoctrination of welfare recipients, with
the burden falling on welfare recipients to complain about
proselytizing.2 'O Third, religious organizations receiving such
government money receive a special privilege to trump the
antidiscrimination laws.20 2
198. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra note 1, at 65-66.
199. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. IV 1998); Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1994); Community
Services Block Grant Program, 42 U.S.C. § 9920 (1998); Fathers Count Act of 1999, H.R.
3073,106th Cong.; Youth Drug and Mental Health Services Act, S. 976,106th Cong. (1999);
Charitable Choice Expansion Act of 1999, S. 1113, 106th Cong.; Charity Empowerment Act
of 1999, H.R. 1607, 106th Cong.; Charity Empowerment Act of 1999, S. 997, 106th Cong.;
Marc Lacey, Bush Fleshes Out Details of Proposal to ExpandAid to Religious Organizations,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A15.
200. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) ("The purpose of this section is to allow States to
contract with religious organizations... on the same basis as any other nongovernmental
provider without impairing the religious character of such organizations .... ."); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9920(bX1) ("A religious organization that provides assistance under a program described
in subsection (a) of this section shall retain its religious character and control over the
definition, development, practice, and expression of its religious beliefs.").
201. See, e.g, 42 U.S.C. § 604a(dX2)(B)("Neitherthe Federal Governmentnor a State shall
require a religious organizaton to... remove religious art, icons, scripture, or other symbols
... ."); see also Charitable Choice Expansion Act of 1999, S. 1113 (allowing a religious
organization funded by charitable choice to "require that its employees providing assistance
under such program adhere to the religious tenets and teachings of such organization).
Senator John Ashcroft has endorsed a"Questions and Answers" guide released by the Center
for Public Justice that notes: "Beneficiaries have access to an alternative provider and may
be deemed to have consented to the religious characteristics and practices of aprovider from
whom they accept service." A Guide to Charitable Choice, A Letter from Senator Ashcroft,
at http:i/cpjustice.org(CGuide/ccqanda.html#letter (last visited Sept. 21, 2000).
202. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604a(f) ("A religious organization's exemption provided under
section 2000e-1 of this title regarding employment practices shall not be affected by its
participation in, or receipt of funds from, programs described in subsection (aX2) of this
874
The structuring of social services by the charitable choice
provisions also reveals a Congress sublimely unconcerned about
placing unfettered power in the hands of religious entities. The way
they are written, a single religious entity could obtain the federal
government contract for an entire state and then have the sole
power to subcontract all of those particular services in that state.
For example, the Baptist Church could obtain the teenage drug
dependency contract for the entire state of Illinois and then hold the
power to determine what other entities in Illinois would receive
federal funds for teenage drug dependency services. °3
The original platform was to reduce welfare for the purpose of
getting people back to work and restoring their dignity, and to
underwrite tax cuts. 204 But government and politicians found it
impossible to remove themselves from welfare as fully as they could
have. Welfare was reduced, but welfare cuts did not ineluctably
lead to tax cuts. Rather, the federal government retained control of
the welfare purse. The rising political power of religion made it the
most attractive recipient for these funds, and now we have an
entire movement of religious organizations arguing that it has a
right to government welfare funds to carry out the work the
government failed to provide.0 5
There was another tack: Government could have removed itself
from control of welfare by reducing its involvement and reduced tax
section.").
203. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9920(e) ("If an eligible entity or other organization... acting
under a contract... with the Federal Government or a State or local government, is given
the authority under the contract or agreement to select nongovernmental organizations to
provide assistance... [this organization] shall have the same duties under this section as
the government.").
204. See, e.g.,RepublicanNational Committee, Principles ofthe 1996RepublicanPlatform,
at http:l/www.rnc.org/2000/96platform2 (last visited Sept. 21,2000) ("Because we recognize
our obligation to foster hope and opportunity for those unable to care for themselves, we
believe in welfare reform that eliminates waste, fraud and abuse; requires work from those
who are capable; limits time on public assistance; discourages illegitimacy; and reduces the
burden on the taxpayers.").
205. See, e.g., Prepared Statement ofDave Batty, Executive Director, Teen Challenge, Inc.,
Brooklyn, NY Before the House Ways and Means Committee, Human Resources
Subcommittee, FED. NEWSSERVICE, Oct. 28,1997,available in LEXIS, News Library, Federal
News Service File ("There is a great need for the federal government to find appropriate
ways to partner with faith-based programs which are proving to be so successful in treating
those with drug addictions.").
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rates proportionally.0 6 The reduction in tax rates would have freed
more money per capita that could have been used by the people to
support the charities, including religious, of their choice-a move
that is encouraged through tax deductions.0 7 Yet, the federal
government could not trust the people to use their money
charitably, could not release its control over the purse, and religion
could not resist this large pot of money, both refusing to
acknowledge that money coming from individuals would have fewer
strings attached than money coming from the government.
IV. SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM PERILS OF IGNORING MADISON'S
MANY WARNINGS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AID FOR RELIGION
The arts-funding cases and the story of Grant's Peace Policy
should make clear that government funding of First Amendment-
protected activities is a poisoned apple. In the short term, religious
entities may benefit from the increased cash flow, whether it is
achieved through direct handouts, tax schemes, or vouchers. More
money equals more means to achieve the religious organization's
goals. When those goals are laudatory, like getting kids off drugs,
it is hard to see any long-term risk that outweighs the short-term
benefit. In the short term, church and state will retain sufficient
separation through the lingering aura of former Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and, therefore, it would appear to be a win-
win situation.
While government and religion will retain their nominal
identities in the short term, however, the two will increasingly
become unequal financial partners. As religion becomes the beggar,
like the churches acting as agents under Grant's Peace Policy,
asking for this amount of money for this mission at this particular
time, government will become the enslaver, capable of demanding
accountability and loyalty.
As time marches on, it will be increasingly difficult to tell the
difference between government and religion, because of the
206. See generally Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The
Untapped Potential of Middle. and Low.Income Generosity, 6 CORNELLJ.L. &PUB.POL'Y325,
327-29 (1997) (arguing that tax deductions for gifts to charitable organizations should be
expanded to help compensate for reductions in welfare spending).
207. See id.
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blending of their roles and their money."' Such a church/state
compact would submerge the healthy distrust built into the core of
the Constitution that ensures the two entities challenge each other.
In the long term, these protections must give way: either
government's passionate embrace ofreligion will lead to the public's
inability to know how its money is being used or religion will have
to open its doors and books for the public to read. By introducing
widespread government support for religious entities, government
not only funds those entities currently providing the services it
seeks to provide, but also creates an incentive to claim a religious
basis for a program. To state the matter slightly differently, by
providing the carrot of special treatment for religious entities,
wealth transfers to religious entities send the message that it pays
to be religious. Those religious organizations that actually do
provide for the general welfare will be joined by many others. The
one disestablishment principle currently at its maximum is that the
government cannot distinguish between different religions based on
their theology. When the Luciferians want to assist troubled youth
or the Ku Klux Klan seeks oversight ofwelfare-to-work, they cannot
be rejected on the basis of their theology. No matter how drunk we
are with the wonders of religion-and it does display wonders at
times-the constitutional instinct to balance power between church
and state will drive government to find neutral reasons for choosing
to fund some religions and not others. We know the outcome: the
inter-sect disputes generated by Grant's Peace Policy. Instead of
wandering into the battlefield of righteousness over differing
theologies, one might as well start by providing neutral reasons for
choosing to fund any religion from the beginning. This is the path
that requires exploration if the political will to fund religious
organizations persists. Neutrality and accountability ought to be
the watchwords for this tightrope feat.
Germany offers a startling example of the results of government
involvement in religious finances. In Germany, individuals do not
give directly to their churches, but rather the government taxes
individuals who claim church membership and transfers the funds
208. To some degree, we are already there with respect to government funding ofreligious
social services carried out by nonsectarian organizations like Catholic Charities. See
MONS A, supra note 10, at 50-51.
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to the churches from government coffers.2°9 The result has been less
voluntary giving to churches and a sense that no individual holds
responsibility for the church's mission. Rather, the government
holds sole responsibility for the churches' financial plight.
Attendance and giving have gone down in a way that suggests a
wedge was driven between the people and their churches by the
government's intervention as banker for the churches.
Taking the arts-funding cases and the Peace Policy together with
the German example, it becomes clear that when government
intervenes in church finances, it alienates, attempts to control, and
assumes the church will serve its ends. Church and state cease to
operate as mutual checks on each other, each losing sight of their
independent role in serving the people. On the one hand, then,
churches are disempowered.
On the other hand, government funding will enrich certain
churches-those that serve the ends government has identified-as
compared to other churches. A church/state compact consisting of
ideologically mainstream religions, and which gathers to itself
government money for certain core, religious missions will lead to
greater intolerance than is already inevitably present in a religious
society. 1' Tolerance is never absolute, but rather a matter of degree
in each society. It has been achieved to the degree it has in the
United States only because we have realized Madison's vision of
separate sects, each free to persuade the other of its truth, but
neither empowered with the government's might to accomplish its
own ends at the expense of all others. Government funding of
certain religions that stand shoulder-to-shoulder with government
will trigger an intolerance of those left out of the funding stream
(whether by choice or ideology) that will invite nothing short of war,
as much as I hesitate to make such a strong statement.
If not war, massive government support for religious entities will
engender an inevitable backlash by those who are not part of the
209. Under the authority of Article 137 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919, established
religious communities (Catholic Church, various Protestant denominations, Judaism) were
authorized to collect tax from their members. See GERMAN CONST. OF 1919, reprinted in
ALBERTP. BLAUSTEIN &JAYA. SIGLER, CONSITUONS THAT MADE HISTORY 379 (1988). The
continued validity of this provision is confirmed expressly by Article 140 of the Basic Law of
the Federal Republic. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 140 (F.R.G.).
210. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church
and State, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2255, 2264-65 (1997).
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believing coterie. The upshot could be a backlash against religion.
Let religion systematically abuse children on government money;
let it refuse to report how it has spent government largesse, and
there will be an equal and opposite reaction. The distance and
barriers between church and state instituted by the Establishment
Clause reduce the likelihood of warfare. The swing of the pendulum
is built into the U.S. Constitution, and the pendulum will swing
back if the people perceive privilege and unfairness:
At that time, we had in the United States a revolution against
established churches and against the special privileges they
received. We are now witnessing a counter-revolution by the
Supreme Court, by government, and some Christian agencies.
What we are now facing is an acute danger, as well as a great
opportunity.2
11
These bleak, Madisonian predictions are no less accurate now than
they were a decade ago when John Witte said:
For many people-adherents and antagonists alike-tax
exemptions and other legal privileges have rendered the
contemporary church too mercenary, too opulent, and too self-
indulgent. The church's voluntary renunciation of one of its
privileges would do much to allay the anxieties of its adherents
and to parry the attacks of its antagonists.212
CONCLUSION
Madison's rule of "not three pence" to religious entities was not
hyperbole, but rather evidence of a sage understanding of the way
in which power operates through church and state. This era has
failed to use the Establishment Clause as a meaningful weapon
against the slide down the slippery slope Madison identified. The
tide of government financial aid to religions has increased nearly
imperceptibly.
The steady, silent, incremental increase of wealth transfers to
religion has given presidential candidates and federal and state
211. Swomley, supra note 144, at 602.
212. Witte, supra note 142, at 415.
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legislators the sense that they cross no meaningful constitutional
or moral lines when they advocate giving government money or
benefits directly to religious organizations. Not only are the
examples of wealth transfer in this Article in tension with
Madison's core understanding of the Establishment Clause, but
they are also the opening of new paths to new instances of First
Amendment infringement by trustee-minded representatives. If the
arts cases are as much of a strong indicator as I argue in Part III,
then these various instances of government funding in the religious
context inevitably will lead to government attempts at suppression
through condemnation, assertion of direct control, and pledges to
control the religious recipient or situation in the future when the
religious organization challenges majority preconceptions. 3 There
is already a harbinger of this in the congressional response to the
revelation that Army bases were permitting Wiccans to practice
their religion on Army bases pursuant to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act-a discovery greeted with cries of outrage from
members of Congress.214
The message of the arts cases is that government financing of
First Amendment-centered activities inevitably comes with strings
attached-dangerous strings. If the current increases in wealth
transfer continue apace, the result is likely to be government
attempts at suppression of religious practices and beliefs. Such
attempts will increase geometrically as government aid programs
collide with the constitutional requirement that prohibits the
government from denying benefits on the basis of belief, creed, or
sect identity. A white supremacist group may well build a school
with the political savvy to apply for and obtain voucher funds.
When the funds start flowing to groups whose beliefs are not
reflected in the mainstream, the reality that such aid can
underwrite religious proselytization and mission will come home to
roost. There will be loud complaints about the money flowing to
those religions, just as government aid to religion has been decried
213. See supra notes 79-103 and accompanying text (discussingthe pattern of government
response in arts cases).
214. See, e.g., Kim Sue & Lia Perkes, Wiccans Becoming More at Home in Military: Their
Numbers Are Small, but Fort Hood's Openness Continues to Generate a Heated Response,
DALLASMORNINGNEWS, May 29, 1999, at 1G, auailable in 1999 WL 4124184 (reportingthat
Representative Bob Barr asked Fort Hood's commanding officer to "stop this nonsense").
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most vociferously when public morality was challenged by an
artwork.215  k
When controversial religions step into the government aid line,
there will be an impetus to cut such funding altogether. No one
suggested eradicating or reducing the budget of the National
Endowment for the Arts until it funded works that offended certain
mainstream quarters. The reasons for defunding in that
circumstance were viewpoint-discriminatory and unconstitutional.
The root of the constitutional violation is the flow of money from the
government to a First Amendment-protected activity in the first
place. Just as the NEA should have been defunded to free art;216
religion, and especially its mission, should not be funded.
Otherwise, diversity and tolerance are seriously threatened. As
Republicans learned with the NEA, however, once a funding stream
is established, no matter how thin the trickle, it is nearly, if not
utterly, impossible to stop the stream altogether.
The Peace Policy teaches yet another Madisonian lesson, and that
is that when competing sects seek government aid, the sect that
does not receive the aid will complain, making interdenominational
conflict inevitable in a world of limited government funds flowing
into mission activities. Moreover, when government abandons its
role as trustee over the use of the money, the results can be
disastrous. Conversely, when government interposes itself in the
financial relationship between the believer and the Church, giving
can become a duty rather than charity.
The current wave of wealth transfer to religious organizations is
building a church-state compact that could defy accountability,
accessibility, and limitation. Such was the equation of tyranny
James Madison understood all too well.
215. See supra notes 78-103 and accompanying text (discussing pattern of government
response in arts cases).
216. See Hamilton, Art Speech, supra note 21.
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